(Re)construction of national security discourse in the context of the Ukrainian crisis: Finland, Estonia, Russia by Ahi, Eda
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF TARTU 
European College 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis  
 
 
Eda Ahi 
(RE)CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY DISCOURSE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS: FINLAND, ESTONIA, RUSSIA 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Viacheslav Morozov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tartu 2015 
  
  
 
I have written the Master’s thesis independently.  
All works and major viewpoints of the other authors, data from other sources of 
literature and elsewhere used for writing this paper have been referenced.  
Eda Ahi, 14.05.2015 
Student’s code: B35224 
 
 
The defence takes place: 29.05.2015, Tartu  
Opponent: Thomas Linsenmaier  
  
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the supervisor of my thesis, Prof. Viacheslav Morozov, for his 
continuous guidance and helpful comments throughout the writing process. Also, I am 
very grateful to the opponent, Thomas Linsenmaier, for the extensive feedback and all 
the good advice. Needless to say, my thanks are also extended to the kindest staff of the 
European College.   
  
 
(Re)construction of National Security Discourse in the Context of the Ukrainian 
Crisis: Finland, Estonia, Russia 
Author: Eda Ahi 
Supervisor: Prof. Viacheslav Morozov 
Date: 29.05.2015 
Language and size of the thesis: English (56 pp) 
 
MASTER’S THESIS 
 
This Master’s Thesis provides a hypothesis-generating comparative case study that 
focuses on the structures of three national security discourses in the context of the 
Ukrainian crisis: Finnish, Estonian and Russian. More specifically, it looks at the 
official (presidential and governmental) articulations concerning the crisis situation in 
Ukraine and its impacts on national and European security. Drawing upon 
poststructuralist security theories, most importantly the securitisation theory, the main 
aim of the thesis is to better understand the connection between security policy and 
national identity in the selected cases, in order to subsequently propose hypotheses for 
further research.  
After explaining the theoretical framework, the an analysis of the discourses at two 
levels – national and European – demonstrates that the structural pattern of the selected 
national security discourses is somewhat counter-intuitive. Although the Finnish and the 
Estonian case initially seem to share a number of common features, at deeper levels, the 
two discourses differ significantly. At the same time, a closer look reveals the 
underlying structural similarity of Estonian and Russian security discourses. Namely, 
the two tend to be more polarised and use antagonisation, protagonisation and 
historisation, whereas their Finnish counterpart remains relatively neutral with regard to 
the Ukrainian crisis. The findings confirm that the link between policy and identity is 
relatively stable and cannot be seen as one-to-one. Instead, it is embedded into wider 
structures of memory. Finally, hypotheses for further research are suggested.   
 
Keywords: national security, national identity, securitisation, poststructuralist IR, 
Ukrainian crisis  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
This Master’s Thesis is a hypothesis-generating comparative case study that focuses on 
the structures of three national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis: 
Finnish, Estonian and Russian. More specifically, it looks at the official (presidential 
and governmental) articulations concerning the crisis situation in Ukraine and its 
impacts on national and European security.   
  It has widely been noted that the Ukrainian crisis that broke out in the common 
neighbourhood of the EU and Russia in autumn 2013 has accentuated the differences 
between the Western and Russian understanding of security policy. Moreover, the ways 
how countries perceive and articulate the reasons and the nature of the Ukrainian crisis, 
but also the possible responses and solutions to it, has elucidated and/or further 
emphasised the internal differences within the EU and NATO. Thus, it is 
understandable that in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, a significant number of 
studies have focused on an analysis of EU-Russia relations (e.g. Haukkala, 2015; 
Makarychev & Yatsyk 2015), as well as on those between Russia and the US (e.g. 
Kamp, 2014). Also, a considerable amount of studies has concentrated on Russian 
policy towards Ukraine and its motivations for invading the neighbouring country, 
mostly from a realist perspective (e.g. Bock et al., 2014; Götz, 2015), but not only (e.g. 
Lindley-French, 2014; Tsygankov, 2015), and also on the EU policies towards Ukraine 
(e.g. Delanoe, 2014; Pridham, 2014). In addition, the relation of the phenomenon of 
Novorossiya to Russian nationalism has been subjected to research (Laruelle, 2015). 
The Ukrainian crisis has been studied with focus of new forms of warfare (e.g. Allenby, 
2015), but also the traditional military power, with specific emphasis on the nuclear 
dimension (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2014).  
   This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature on the Ukrainian crisis by 
offering a comparative poststructuralist reading of national security debates on the 
situation. While there is a growing body of research aiming to explain Russian policies 
towards Ukraine in the context of the crisis, these often seem to emphasise the 
difference between Russia and the Western countries. I argue that this is not always the 
case – while a comparison between Russia and the EU as a whole seems to easily 
correspond to the presumption of difference, a
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comparison of Russia to European national discourses, especially in the security realm, 
can give another result (see also Lamoreaux, 2014). Furthermore, elucidating the 
structures of national security discourses facilitates further research for explanations of 
the internal discrepancies of the larger blocs of countries, such as the EU. In addition, 
choosing to analyse national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis 
may be particularly fruitful due to the geographical and symbolic proximity of the 
conflict zone.   
  While security studies have traditionally focused on the state, the 
conceptualisation of security has been significantly widened since the late 1980s. 
Poststructuralist IR has played a considerable role in the matter, introducing relevant 
theoretical perspectives such as securitisation theory (Buzan et al., 1998; Aradau, 2004; 
Balzacq, 2005), ontological security (Mitzen, 2006) or mnemonical security (Mälksoo, 
2015). In these approaches, the focus has gradually shifted away from the state as the 
principal object of security studies. In fact, poststructuralists argue that national security 
is not only about physical security of the state, but can be extended to other issues if it 
meets the criteria of securitisation. Moreover, poststructuralist approach holds that 
policies are speech acts, that is discursive acts. Thus, in the context of emerging 
geopolitical debates regarding the Ukrainian crisis, this thesis aims to offer a somewhat 
alternative explanation to the current understanding of security, and subsequently 
policies, of the states. Accepting national security policies as a given, without an 
analysis of how threats come to life, in other words are constructed, can lead to 
inadequate political responses. Hence, a critical analysis of national security discourses 
is necessary for a detailed understanding of how motives of states are articulated. 
Subsequently, this allows the policy community to find ways to provide answers to their 
policies.   
 The selection of cases has been motivated by their relevance in terms of 
meaningful patterns of similarities and differences. Estonia and Finland share a 
significant number of the former – e.g. both are small in size and population, both are 
member states of the European Union and have a small defence budget in absolute 
terms as compared to Russia. Russia, on the other hand, can in many ways be seen as an 
opposite to the other two cases. Nonetheless, when the focus of the comparison is 
shifted to the official articulations of these countries on the security issues in the context 
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of the Ukrainian crisis, it does not appear to follow the same logical pattern. Namely, 
Estonian national security debate on the Ukrainian crisis differs from its Finnish 
counterpart, whereas some preliminary similarities concerning the structure of the 
articulations can be detected between the Estonian and the Russian case. This offers 
ground for a fruitful poststructuralist analysis of national security discourses that looks 
for explanations to the somewhat surprising pattern of differences and similarities in the 
structure of the discourses. In fact, this thesis argues that the results of an analysis of the 
structures of the three national security discourses is counter-intuitive.   
  The main aim of the thesis is to better understand the connection between 
security policy and national identity in the three countries, by drawing on 
poststructuralist security theories, and subsequently propose possible generalizations 
beyond the selected cases by generating hypotheses for further research. The main 
research questions that stem from the aim are:  
1) How are national security and national identity linked in the national security 
discourses of Finland, Russia and Estonia in the context of the Ukrainian crisis? 
2) Which generalizations do the cases in questions suggest regarding the 
connection between national security policies and national identity? 
The aim is achieved by completing the following research tasks: collecting data from 
the official governmental and presidential websites of the three cases, using 
poststructuralist discourse analysis, specifically securitisation theory, to identify 
structural patterns in the discourses, comparing the structural patterns and, finally, 
generating hypotheses for further research.   
  The research design follows the principles of poststructuralist research proposed 
by Lene Hansen (2006). It is a multiple-Self (Russia, Estonia, Finland) one-moment (the 
context of the Ukrainian crisis) one-event (national security discourse) study of official 
national security discourses. The choice of official discourse as an object of study stems 
from the poststructuralist argument that national security discourses are most 
significantly shaped on the level of political elites, especially the government. The 
empirical material includes official press releases, speeches and interviews published on 
the governmental and presidential websites of the chosen countries. According to 
Hansen’s (2006) criteria for data collection, speeches, due to their wide audience and 
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political relevance, are the most useful data for analysing official discourse. Thus, 
particular attention has been given to analysing longer speeches, but also interviews 
published on the official websites. The data has been collected according to the time 
frame of the study: from mid-August 2013 until March 2015. Although the beginning of 
the Ukrainian crisis is usually dated to November 2013 when the President of Ukraine, 
Viktor Yanukovych, put an end to preparations for signing the EU Association 
Agreement, a number of significant events preceded the outbreak of the crisis. Thus, the 
preceding months might be significant in terms of outlining the discursive structures.  
   The theory chapter of the thesis provides a conceptualisation of security, national 
identity and the more specific term of national security using the poststructuralist 
framework, particularly securitisation theory. In addition, it explains the basics of 
poststructuralist discourse analysis, outlines the research design that mainly draws upon 
Lene Hansen’s recommendations is outlined and explains data collection. The empirical 
part of the thesis is divided into two larger chapters: construction of threats to national 
security and that of threats to European security. This follows the logic of Wæver 
(2002) who claims that national security cannot be fully studied without taking into 
account its regional element. In the first among the empirical chapters, construction of 
threats to national sovereignty, to territorial integrity and to the principle of non-
intervention is discussed. The chapter argues that there are significant structural 
similarities in Estonian and Russian discourses, whereas their Finnish counterpart 
differs from them. In the second empirical chapter, construction of threats to European 
security (and through it) is discussed in two sections that address values and stability in 
Europe (geopolitical threats and threats stemming from radicalism). The chapter argues 
that the cases conceptualise European security system rather differently, however, more 
structural similarities, such as a strong polarisation, can be found between the Russian 
and the Estonian case, whereas Finland is very much different from its counterparts. 
Finally, concluding remarks are presented, alongside making generalisations and 
providing hypotheses for further research. 
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2. THEORY, METHOD, CONCEPTS  
 
Respecting the reluctance of the poststructuralist approach to make a strict distinction 
between theory and method and define ’theory’ in ’traditional’ ways (see Hansen, 1997, 
pp. 384; Klein, 1994), theory and method are presented as intertwined in this chapter 
and not divided into strict sections of ’theory’ and ’method’. First, I discuss the general 
meaning of the concept of security within the context of poststructuralist security 
studies, alongside some of the main basic premises of the poststructuralist perspective. 
Second, I conceptualise “national identity” and attempt narrow down the general 
concept of security in order to show how the problematic notion of ’national security’ is 
conceptualised in this study. This also involves linking it to (or rather merging it with) 
the level of regional, specifically European security. Subsequently, I outline the 
classification of structural tendencies used in the empirical chapters. Third, I explain the 
basic premises of poststructuralist discourse analysis. Fourth, I outline the research 
design according to the main principles of poststructuralist research design. Lastly, I 
explain the principles of data collection.  
 
2.1. THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY IN POSTSTRUCTURALISM  
In order to give a better explanation of the concept of ‘security’ as it is applied in this 
study, it is first necessary to provide a brief overview as to the basic principles of 
poststructuralist approach to the social world. Importantly, poststructuralist theory that 
provides the broader theoretical framework for this study, mainly stems from 
structuralist tradition. Thus, contrary to a widespread belief, poststructuralism does not 
mean ’anti-structuralism’ (Wæver, 2002, pp. 23). More specifically, poststructuralism 
emerged as a radicalisation of structuralism by authors who were at the time (late 
1960s) seen as structuralists, such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault (ibidem). In 
addition to arguing against the structuralist view of stability in language, 
poststructuralist thought has heavily problematised the rational (both idealist and realist) 
perspective for the presumption of objectivity and the desire to meet the methodological 
and epistemological standards of natural science (Hansen, 1997, p. 371). Nonetheless, it 
is important to note that poststructuralism is not the only perspective that engages in 
critical-reflexivist research and critique of realist and liberalist perspectives. This has 
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also been done by related perspectives such as Critical Theory (e.g. Hoffmann, 1987), 
constructivism (e.g. Krachctowil, 1989; Wendt, 1987, 1999) and feminism (e.g. Weber, 
1994). (Hansen,1997, pp. 372-3; Wæver, 1997)  
  However, the main aspect that distinguishes poststructuralism from other critical 
perspectives, is the core understanding of language as a system that is not determined by 
a an outside ’reality’. This understanding stems from stucturalist linguistics that 
followed Ferdinand de Saussure’s groundbreaking ideas. Saussure (1960) argues that 
the meaning of the words is not inherent in them, but merely a result of social 
conventions – in other words, signs are arbitrary. In addition, Saussure makes a 
distinction between langue and parole – the former is the structure of language (the 
network of signs that give meaning to each other), the latter is a situated language use. 
Furthermore, in this view, parole must always draw on langue. Although 
poststructuralism stems from structuralism in terms of accepting the idea that meanings 
are attributed to signs not through their relations to reality, but through internal 
structures (networks) of signs, it argues against another basic premise of structuralism 
that stipulates a view of language as a stable, unchangeable structure, and affirms that 
signs change according to context (Laclau, 1993). Hence, the sharp distinction between 
langue and parole is dissolved (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 8-12). As a result, 
language (and discursive) structures are seen as fixed in a specific moment, but at the 
same time inherently unstable (Hansen, 2006, pp. 20-1; Hansen, 2011, p. 361).   
  This poststructuralist view of language is subsequently expanded to all social 
practices, including security – security does not exist prior to but in language as a 
discursive practice (cf. Walt, 1991). This allows postructuralism to meet one of its 
principle aims in the realm of security studies: to broaden the understanding of 
’security’ (see Buzan & Hansen, 2009, cf. Knudsen, 2001; Shah, 2010). Importantly, 
poststructuralists attempt to challenge the widespread understanding of security as 
purely ’national security’ by exposing the structures of security discourses in a wider 
array of issues (e.g. see Sjöstedt, 2008; Vuori, 2010).  
 Thus, all poststructuralist thought is based on the notion that security should be 
analysed as a discursive practice that is simultaneously also a political practice, whereas 
there is no clear division between the two (Hansen, 1997, p. 376). Deriving from the 
linguistic roots of poststructuralist thought is the general idea that security should be 
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seen as a speech act (see Huysmans, 2011). As Wæver (1995a, p. 55) notably states, 
’/.../ security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance 
itself is the act’. Thus, by ’speaking security’ something is done, just like in betting or 
promising (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 26; see also Austin, 2000). Nonetheless, it is hereby 
important to keep in mind that in order to ’speak security’, in other words to transform 
something into being a security issue, one does not necessarily need to pronounce the 
word ’security’ – the mechanisms can work in a more subtle and sophisticated way and 
still lead to the same result. Moreover, there can be several political reasons for not 
pronouncing the word. Most often, the state gets to articulate what is seen as a ’real 
threat’. Therefore, security practices are often a part of political and material struggles 
within the political elite. (Hansen, 1997, pp. 376-8)   
  Nevertheless, poststructuralism does not completely deny the realist view 
according to which ’security’ is necessary for the state, it simply understands this 
necessity differently from the realist perspective. Contrary to the the traditional 
understanding of security, according to which a state has to be protected from the 
external threats, Campbell (1992, p. 55) argues that states need ’threats’ because their 
identities depend on them. In other words, threats and insecurity are not just potential 
ways of undermining the state, they also constitute it (Buzan et al, 1998; Hansen, 2006; 
cf. Balzacq, 2005; Floyd, 2010). Nonetheless, whilst more positivist perspectives often 
see ’security’ as something positive, poststructuralists ask whether this is always true 
(e.g. Aradau, 2004; cf. Roe, 2012). They suggest that all issues do not need to be 
securitised – possibly there are other means of dealing with them. Instead of a further 
securitisation of issues, poststructuralists propose their occasional desecuritisation 
which means moving the issues farther from the realm of security, into the realm of 
politics. (Wæver, 1995; cf. Roe, 2012; see also Mälksoo, 2015)  
  Whilst poststructuralism has often been very critical of other, more positivist 
approaches, its basic principles have continuously been an object of critique. For 
instance, poststructuralism has been criticised for the lack of connection with ’reality’ 
and the inability to distinguish between real and false/perceived threats that might 
subsequently be mistreated or ignored (Hansen, 1997, pp. 382-4). Nonetheless, the fact 
that the threats are constructed through discursive practices does not imply that these 
should be treated as ’false’ (ibidem) – poststructuralism does not deny the existence of 
  
13 
 
the ’material’, it just affirms the material character of every discursive structure (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985, p. 108). What it does deny, though, is the existence of an ‘extra-
discursive’, ‘objective’ social reality. Therefore, it is mistaken to claim that 
poststructuralism is an ideational enterprise (Wæver, 2002, p. 22). Also, interestingly 
enough the poststructuralist approach to security has been criticised for using radical 
othering in terms of opposing itself to ’traditional approaches’, whereas the approach 
claims to aim at exposing such practices (Miller, 2010, p. 645).    
  Despite the significant amount of criticism (but also thanks to it), it is a useful and 
elaborate approach to security issues for several reasons. Instead of putting the emphasis 
on ’objective’ and ’external’ variables or mixing discursive with ’real’, the approach 
works exclusively within the discursive field and elucidates the discursive structure of 
security practices. This helps us to understand how and why we understand security in a 
particular way and attribute specific meanings to it. Moreover, a closer analysis reveals 
how cases that appear to be very different, to the extent of confrontational relationship 
based on radical otherness, actually have very similar discursive structures. In addition, 
another advantage of poststructuralist perspective to security is that it can make 
politicians and academics aware of the choice they make when they place something 
into the security realm, that is ’speak security’ – security (threat) is not an objective 
matter, but rather a way to frame a specific issue. Understanding how the national 
security of one’s own state and those of the others are constructed contributes to 
deliberately creating adequate policies. 
2.2. DECONSTRUCTING THE LANGUAGE OF SECURITY  
This study relies on the securitisation theory as a tool to unlock the national security 
discourses and show how their threats are constructed vis-à-vis the national identities 
they articulate. This section aims to discuss the development and previous applications 
of the securitisation theory.    
  As is widely known, the term was coined by Ole Wæver and initially developed 
by the so-called Copenhagen school. The introductory section of this chapter briefly 
pointed out how the poststructuralist understanding of the construction of a security 
issue (a threat) is strongly linked to the speech act theory (see also Huysmans, 2011; cf. 
Balzacq, 2005), but did not explain the exact ways in which the process functions. In 
fact, by the act of ’speaking security’, a particular issue is highlighted as something 
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extraordinarily important and placed into an area where extraordinary means can be 
used, that is, securitised. Framing an issue in security terms means that it is presented as 
a point of no return – it implies that if the issue is not given full priority at once, then 
’we will not be here to tackle the other more mundane matters’ (Wæver, 1996, p. 108). 
The presentation of a specific issue as a security issue implies that it is a matter of 
’survival’ – if the Self does not act immediately against the threat, it will be ’too late’. 
This demonstrates the self-referentiality of security discourses: instead of acting upon a 
’real threat’, there must be a successfully constructed threat that has to be tackled by 
’us’, by the Self . Nonetheless, securitisation is not a one way street – it contains the 
party that securitises, or speaks security, but the act is complete only when accepted by 
the audience. In addition, there is always a referent object – the object that is presented 
as being threatened (which is very often the state) (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32-7).   
  One of the principal aims of this theoretical framework has been to give way to a 
broader understanding of security since it allows to conceptualise security in other terms 
than the traditional ’military’ or ’state security’ view. Indeed, the theory has well 
contributed to the spillover of ’security’ into realms and disciplines other than security 
studies. Just to give a few examples, it has been applied in order to research the resets of 
the Atomic Scientists’ so-called Doomsday Clock (Vuori, 2010), organised crime 
(Stritzel, 2012), migration (Kaya, 2012), HIV and AIDS (McInnes & Rushton, 2011; 
Sjöstedt, 2008). Its applications have also extended to the realm of energy security 
(Christou & Adamides, 2013), discrimination of minorities (Olesker, 2014) and 
environmental security (Stetter et al., 2011).  
  However, at the same time, the theory has provoked intense debates and as a 
result, there is an extensive body of meta-theoretical literature on the concept itself and 
its applications, some stemming from explicit critique, some expanding the concept and 
its usage. For instance, it has been questioned whether securitisation should always be 
depicted as a negative issue and a question has been raised as to the normative aspects 
of securitisation (Floyd, 2011). Securitisation has been criticised for being too narrow 
(McDonald, 2008), for underestimating the central concept of the ’audience’ (Balzacq, 
2005) and for being unable to tackle new emerging security issues (Aradau, 2006). 
Nonetheless, most of the critique has also included or led to solutions and responses, 
further extending the concept and the theory. Thus, one can say that securitisation has 
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offered a remarkably long-lasting terrain for academic debate, which is still ongoing.   
  As already pointed out, this study uses securtisation theory as a methodological 
tool in its more ’traditional’ sense, which in my view is particularly useful to make 
sense of and elucidate the main referent objects that the national security discourses 
articulate.  
2.3. LINKING SECURITY AND IDENTITY    
In this section, I conceptualise the central concepts of identity and national security in 
order to further outline the preliminary link between the two and propose a number of 
analytical categories applied in the empirical chapter of this thesis.   
2.3.1. THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY IN POSTSTRUCTURALISM   
This subsection discusses the concept of (national) identity by drawing upon 
constructivist and poststructuralist literature on the issue. Particularly, it outlines the 
features that are characteristic of the poststructuralist approach that underlies this study. 
It can be seen as an introduction to the subsection on national security that follows, 
since national security and identity are presented as intertwined in the analysis.   
  The role of identity in the IR discipline varies depending on the theoretical 
framework adopted in analysis (Aydin-Düzgit, 2013, pp. 524-6). While it is considered 
to be rather marginal in realism and liberalism, it is central in poststructuralist and 
constructivist works (ibidem). As Sjösted states (2013), since the publications of 
influential constructivist works on identity and security (e.g. Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 
1996), identity has been viewed as one of the key concepts in constructivist accounts on 
international security issues. In fact, identity concerns the way actors perceive 
themselves and others (Wendt, 1999). Identity constructions have been viewed as 
determining states’ interests and security policies (Sjöstedt, 2013, pp. 147-8).  
  Discussions of the concept of identity rarely overlook the extensive work of 
Alexander Wendt. The core idea of his work is that identities are not given but 
transformed, and also sustained, through intersubjective processes (Wendt 1996, 1999; 
see also Zehfuss, 2001). Moreover, identities provide the basis for interests (Wendt, 
1992). Thus, the ’anarchy’ of the international system depends on the conceptions of the 
security actors have and on how they construct their identities in relation to others 
(Zehfuss, 2001, pp. 319-21). Nonetheless, the concept of identity in the Wendtian sense 
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is seen as rather problematic (Zehfuss, 2001; Epstein, 2013, cf. Jackson, 2001). Some of 
the relevant critique stems from Wendt’s conceptualisation of identity is multifaceted 
and interestingly also contains the ’corporate’ aspect of identity which is considered to 
be ’exogenously given’ (Wendt, 1999, p. 328; Zehfuss, 2001, pp. 320-3).  
  As Epstein (2013, pp. 504-5) argues, identity provided constructivism with the 
possibility to loosen the givens of rationalism, but at the same time assumes a 
poststructuralist perspective and critiques Wendt’s undoubtedly relevant position for 
perceiving identity as a ’given’, thus falling back onto the naturalist model in terms of 
identity. In Wendt’s work states are seen as natural, this in turn guarantees their 
’realness’. Instead of a search for universals, a more poststructuralist view of identity 
conceptualises it as completely contingent. 
 In fact, poststructuralists argue against a conceptualisation of identity as a variable 
in foreign policy, since identity is ’constitutive’ of foreign policy (Campbell, 1992; 
Hansen, 2006; Aydin-Düzgit, 2013). Nonetheless, the argument against causality (cf. 
Guzzini, 2011) does not imply a lack of structure – just like language, identities are 
highly structured and at the same time inherently unstable (Hansen, 2006, pp. 20-1). 
They are constantly (re)constructed in discourse, whereas language is seen as 
constitutive of social reality (Aydin-Düzgit, 2013, p. 525). Furthermore, identities are 
ontologically interlinked with foreign policies (Hansen, 2006, p. 21). While identities 
are articulated as a legitimisation for the policies proposed, they are also (re)produced 
through these very articulations in discourse (Hansen, 2006, pp. 21- 6). Also, particular 
state identities are constructed and positioned vis-à-vis one another through foreign 
policies – this constructs a particular reality where certain policies become possible 
(Doty, 1993, p. 305). Importantly, poststructuralist security studies has analysed the 
connection between security and the construction of national identity and shown how 
security is one of the most important practices through which states construct their 
identity (Hansen, 1997, p. 375).   
  While social constructivist argue that identities are not necessarily constructed 
through difference, but also have a pre-social corporate aspect to them, poststructuralists 
conceptualise identity as always relational, i.e. constructed through difference. Derrida 
argues that language is a system of differential signs and meaning is created through a 
number of juxtapositions (Derrida, 1978). Identity is seen to be created in the same way, 
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through two simultaneous processes – the positive process of linking and the negative 
process of differentiation (Hansen, 2006, pp. 18-21). For instance, security practices 
contribute to constructing a national Self and point out the difference between itself and 
the Other (Campbell, 1992, p. 55, see also Neumann, 1996). Nonetheless, it is also 
suggested that the conversion of difference into otherness by established identities 
should be problematised (Connolly, 1991) – one should abstain from concluding too 
easily that the only relationship of otherness is radical and consider other forms of 
difference (Hansen, 1997, p. 390). For instance, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp. 127-34) 
suggest a distinction between the logic of equivalence that divides the discursive space 
into two clear camps and the logic of difference that simply serves to structure social 
space. Therefore, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Other does not always take 
radical forms, as it did, for example, during the Cold War in which the security practices 
operated according to the logic of equivalence (Hansen, 1997, p. 391; see also Milliken, 
2011; Doty, 2006) In other words, antagonisms are not seen as the main source of 
meaning – on the contrary, simple dichotomies are not very informative, it is rather 
differentiated systems of difference that should be preferred (Wæver, 2002, p. 24).  
  Thus, although this thesis does not state that the link between national identity and 
security policy as causal, it does attempt to outline the ’positive’ processes of linking 
and the ’negative’ processes of differentiation in each discourse, as well as discuss the 
levels of radicalism of these processes.  
2.3.2. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
In this thesis, I have chosen to concentrate on a specific security discourse – that of 
national security. The concept is characterised by a strong symbolic meaning and has 
powerfully been highlighted in the political discourse during the Ukrainian crisis. As 
already mentioned in the previous section, poststructuralist security studies see the 
concept of national security as rather complicated and problematic. In effect, a 
characteristic suggestion of poststructuralism is that national security should not be 
idealised (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26) Nonetheless, in case of a valid conceptualisation, it 
is suggested that foreign and security policy can be explained by a structural model of 
national discourses (Wæver, 2002). I will further outline a conceptualisation of ’national 
security’ applied in the context of this study. 
  First, as Walker (1990) points out, the meaning of security is tied to historically 
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specific forms of political community – national security has achieved a prerogative as 
the concept of security. Of course, this does not imply that the state is the only possible 
kind of political community that can ’have security’, but it is still important to note that 
due to historical reasons, in the current context ’security’ is most often linked to ’the 
state’. Moreover, as Lene Hansen (2006, p. 34) notes, ’the underpinning of the concept 
of ’national security’ is a particular form of identity construction – one tied to the 
sovereign state and articulating radical form of identity – and a distinct rhetorical and 
discursive force which bestows power as well as responsibility on those speaking within 
it’ (see also Campbell, 1992). Thus, in addition to being connected to identity, the 
concept of national security is closely linked to that of sovereignty. Sovereignty, on the 
other hand, is usually seen as the ultimate test for the state. (Wæver, 1996, pp. 115-20; 
see also Wæver 1995b; cf. Werner & de Wilde 2001) Furthermore, the identity – 
foreign policy linkage is sealed by a focus on security (in the sense of high politics) 
(Wæver 2002, p. 26), which makes security discourses particularly useful for studying 
the link between national identity and foreign policy.    
  The concept of security is most often used when referring to the nation state. In 
my opinion, Wæver’s (1996) analysis reveals an interesting point that is of high (social) 
relevance in the context of this study: namely, he argues that the distinction between 
state and nation is usually not reflected upon – ’national security’ is simply the common 
name for the ’security of the state’. While this difference has been widely noted and 
addressed in academia, as I further show, this does not always seem to be the case in 
‘everyday’ political discourse. Moreover, Wæver suggests that when we consider the 
concept of ’national security’ (or more specifically, state security), it becomes evident 
that the ’state’ and the ’security’ are inseparable in the concept – they are already 
present in each other. However, Wæver (ibidem) further argues that the confusion 
between ‘state’ and ‘nation’ in ‘national security’ can be avoided by distinguishing 
between the securitising actor and the referent object. He points out that keeping this 
distinction in mind can be useful, for instance, in showing how certain regimes point at 
’the security of the state’, when in reality the regime itself is threatened.  
  The poststructuralist approach therefore suggests that one should judge whether 
the nation or the state is seen as the referent object. In addition, Wæver (2002, pp. 22) 
argues that many IR theories fail to explain ’in a systematic way – beyond historical 
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narrative – why the same cultural and historical background can sustain highly 
contradictory foreign policies’. Thus, poststructuralist approach can be seen as a 
suitable perspective to achieve a shift towards more fully respecting the contingent, self-
producing meaning systems of different actors.    
  In order to provide a clearer distinction between the different ‘securities’ of a state 
or a nation and an explanation to ‘highly contradictory foreign policies’, the important 
concepts of ontological security and mnemonical security have been introduced. The 
idea of ontological security suggests that in addition to physical security, or the security 
of the ‘body’, i.e. the territory, of the state, states also seek ontological security, i.e. the 
security of Self. Thus, states seek security in routinising their relationships with others. 
This, in turn, may lead to the possibility of conflict between physical and ontological 
security – for the sake of maintaining the ontological security of routine, states may 
neglect their physical security, i.e. these two are not directly connected. (Mitzen, 2006) 
Mnemonical security can be seen as an extension and supplementation of the 
ontological security theory in IR. It deals with the securitisation of historical memory as 
a means of securing certain ‘memories’ and delegitimising others. In other words, 
mnemonical security is ‘the idea that distinct understandings of the past should be fixed 
in public remembrance and consciousness in order to buttress an actor’s stable sense of 
self as the basis of its political agency’ (Mälksoo, 2015, p. 2).   
  As to its location in the exterior-interior dichotomy, ’national security’ can be 
seen as located on the very border of the national and the international. Buzan and 
Wæver (2003) suggest that due to the inherent nature of security dynamics, national 
security should not be seen as self-contained – at the regional level, national securities 
of the states are closely enough united and cannot be separated from each other. Thus, 
the national and the regional levels should be studied together in order to understand the 
security concerns of states. Moreover, usually there is more security interaction between 
neighbouring states and, hence, regional security level is characterised by durable 
patterns of amity and enmity and power relations that provide ground for a meaningful 
analysis.   
  Hence, I find it useful to apply in this study, with some modifications, the concept 
of layered discursive structure suggested by Wæver (2002), in order to group security 
issues in the empirical chapter. One of the advantages of the layered structure is that it 
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can specify change within continuity (Wæver, 2002, p. 31). The central categories of 
such layered structure are nation/state and Europe, it stems from the presumption that 
the ’national’ cannot be separated from the ’international’ and therefore these two levels 
should be studied together (cf. Bull, 1977). Thus, the layered framework does not 
suggest that distinct discourses are located on either of the levels, but simultaneously on 
both. I believe that this approach is particularly useful for an analysis of national 
security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis that has brought forth 
articulations concerning European security system as well as explicit articulations on 
national security (which are very difficult to separate).   
 The reason for selecting state/nation and Europe as central categories is that these 
are the forms the ’we’ take (Wæver, 1990, cf. 1992). Thus, the advantage of addressing 
discourses through state/nation is that they turn out to be particularly useful ’lenses of 
identity’ through which to enter the European debates in specific national contexts. 
(Wæver, 2002, pp. 24-5) The analysis is thus focused not simply on ’who’ we are, but 
on the ways one conceives this ’we’ through the articulation of different layers of 
identity in complex constellations of competition and mutual definition. (ibidem) Also, 
it is necessary to keep in mind that the first layer consists of the basic constellation of 
state and nation – the question as to how the two are tied together should be asked in 
order to better understand the ‘European level’ (ibidem). The structure of this study 
emanates from the presumption that in all cases selected for the analysis, there is a 
’national’ and a ’European’ level that can be seen as intertwined. I am well aware that 
when applying this approach, the Russian case may seem problematic at first glance, 
especially compared to the other two countries that are members of the European Union. 
Nonetheless, I argue that if Europe is conceptualised as a common geographical space 
of Russia and the countries of the EU (that is, the main focus is not put on the EU or 
Europe as a political community) where, importantly, the Ukrainian crisis takes place, 
the European level of analysis brings more substance to the analysis of national security 
discourses. This choice is also reflected by the structure of the empirical part of the 
present thesis.   
2.3.3. LINKING THE CONCEPTS 
To start off, I briefly summarise the main points concerning the link between security 
and identity. First, identities are ontologically interlinked with policies (Hansen, 2006, 
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p. 21). While identities are articulated as a legitimisation for the policies proposed, they 
are also (re)produced through these very articulations in discourse (ibid., pp. 21- 6). As 
already pointed out, security is one of the principle practices through which states 
construct their identity (Hansen, 1997, p. 375). At the same time, identity is constructed 
not simply through asserting what the Self is through the positive process of linking, but 
simultaneously through the negative process of differentiation (Hansen, 2006, pp. 18-
21). In other words, it is secured by drawing borders between inside and outside, 
asserting who or what is the enemy. At the same time, one would be mistaken to state 
that identity needs to be secured and be free of threats – it is actually almost the other 
way around. Namely, in order to strengthen the sense of Self, a national identity needs 
threats to persist and reaffirm itself.   
  The empirical part aims to go beyond analysing the discourses merely content-
wise and simply comparing ’the surfaces’ in order to elucidate their underlying 
structural patterns. Thus, I look at a number of structural tendencies through which a 
national Self, but also the Other, is constructed. This means that while two discourses 
may seemingly present opposite views, the structural tendencies beneath the surface can 
actually be the same. The tendencies are as follows: polarisation, neutrality, 
protagonisation, antagonisation and historisation.  
  Most evidently, discourses reflect different degrees of polarisation between Self 
and Other. The presence of polarisation refers to a logic of equivalence, rather than that 
of simple difference – more polarised discourses suggest that identity construction is 
based on a distinction between positive and negative parties, rather than just pointing to 
differences in a more neutral manner. In the official security discourses, the Self is 
usually placed on the positive side of the axis and its policies and positions are thereby 
legitimised. Nonetheless, in other, more ’political’ realms, and especially in marginal 
and oppositional discourse, the Self may well be placed on the negative side of the 
spectrum.  
  Neutrality can be seen as the opposite of polarisation, a lack of thereof. In case 
of neutrality, which almost never manifests itself in a complete sense, a discourse does 
not distinguish between negative and positive entities. While a more neutral discourse 
may draw attention to negative and positive tendencies situation-wise – for instance, 
military presence may be seen as negative –, it abstains from pointing at specific states 
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or other entities as directly positive or negative. Thus, in case of neutrality, a discourse 
reflects a logic of difference rather than the logic of equivalence, whereas the positive 
process of linking prevails in identity construction.   
  The degree of protagonisation and antagonisation in the discourses can be seen 
as directly linked to the presence of polarisation. Protagonisation reflects a high level of 
(symbolic) involvement of the Self in a particular issue. It implies presenting the 
security issues explicitly through the lens of (national) Self, even if a particular threat 
logically concerns another state, thus personalising the issues and making the Self 
central in the discourse. Protagonisation often involves heroisation, an attribution of 
(often inherent) positive characteristics to Self, that in its radical form are presented as 
symbolic and on the verge of being absolute. Antagonisation, on the other hand, 
concerns depicting a specific Other not simply as a potential threat to, but a 
straightforward enemy of Self, and often accompanies strong forms of polarisation. 
Thus, it can be seen as a particularly intense manifestation of othering.   
  Historisation can be seen as an auxiliary discursive tool that serves to enhance 
and legitimise processes of linking or differentiation in identity construction. Thus, 
meanings attributed to Self and Other are fortified/reaffirmed through historical links 
that serve as ’proof’ or confirmation of a certain meaning. For instance, it can 
emphasise an antagonisation through extending an enemy image to the past, often to the 
extent of ’eternalising’ it or enhance a protagonisation by comparing threats projected 
towards another state to those that a past Self has faced. Its wider aim is to legitimise 
certain mnemonical perspectives, whereas delegitimising others.  
  To sum up, I look into the above tendencies in the empirical chapters to make 
sense of how security discourses are constructed and how national identity and security 
policies are linked within them. Hereby, it is necessary to keep in mind that these 
tendencies structure the social world in the national security discourses, whereas 
discursive structures simultaneously condition possible policies, legitimise them and 
reproduce particular kinds of identities. 
2.4 POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
This research project applies poststructuralist discourse analysis as the main method. 
While discourse analysis has become rather popular in social sciences, especially since 
the late 1980s, the concept has various definitions and different applications (Jorgensen 
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& Phillips, 2002, p. 1). Therefore, it is necessary to bring clarity to what is meant by 
discourse analysis in the context of this study. A particularly important aspect to keep in 
mind is that in discourse analysis, theory and method are strongly intertwined (ibid., p. 
4).  
  Most of the discursive approaches are similar in terms of their social 
constructionist premise that stems from structuralist and poststructuralist linguistics 
(ibid., p. 3). Namely, in most of the cases the word ’discourse’ implies the idea that 
language is structured according to various patterns that people’s articulations follow in 
specific domains of social life. Thus, it could generally be defined as ’a particular way 
of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world). (ibid., p. 1)   
  In this thesis, I apply the perspective offered by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe (1985) that is considered to be the ’purest’ poststructuralist approach to 
discourse. It is based on the poststructuralist idea that discourse is constitutive of the 
social world in meaning. Due to the instability of language, this meaning can never be 
permanently fixed. Thus, discourses are constantly being transformed through contact 
with other discourses, through a discursive struggle. (see also Torfing, 2005)  
  Poststructuralist approaches to discourse are especially keen to cite Foucault’s 
definition of discourse, which suggests that discourse is ’a system of dispersion between 
objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices’ that form ’a regularity’ 
(Foucault, 2004). Also, as Jens Bartelson (1995) puts it : ’a discourse is a system for the 
formation of statements.’ Thus, one may conclude that discourse analysis looks for the 
rules that establish what can be said and what not. According to Wæver (2002, p. 29), 
discourse forms a system which is made up of a layered constellation of key concepts. 
Moreover, he suggests that it is not just an empirical registration of a coincidental 
pattern, but also the other way around: as Foucault insisted, discourse is the 
precondition for statements.  
  As for the empirical aspect, Wæver (2002, pp. 26-27) stresses that 
poststructuralist discourse analysis works on public texts – in this study those 
representing the official discourse have been specifically chosen. He further claims that 
poststructuralist discourse analysis does not attempt to guess the hidden thoughts or 
motives of the actors, but quite the contrary – rigorously staying at the level of 
discourse becomes a huge methodological advantage in policy realms where much is 
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hidden, such as foreign or security policy. Thus, the main interest is not in what is really 
believed by decision makers or the whole population, but in the codes that are used 
when actors relate to each other. (ibidem)  
  Furthermore, it is necessary to be conscious about not sliding between discourse 
and perceptions/thoughts. In this way, Wæver (2002, p. 27) suggests, what is often 
presented as a weakness of discourse analysis (how can one know that what is said is 
really meant and is not only a rhetoric?) can be turned into a methodological strength 
when one sticks to discourse as discourse.   
  In the context of this study, it is crucial to stress that according to 
poststructuralism, structures within discourse do not simply establish what can be 
articulated or not, but also condition possible policies – interests cannot be based 
outside of a discursive structure (ibid., p. 30). In a specific political culture there are 
certain basic concepts, figures, narratives and codes, and only on the basis of these 
codes are interests constructed and transformed into policies. A structured analysis of 
domestic arena can thus explain and elucidate the structure of foreign and security 
policies and also outline what conditions them. As Wæver (2002, p. 26) affirms, 
’finding and presenting in a systematic way patterns of thought in a specific country 
will always be helpful in making the debates and actions of that country more 
intelligible to other observers. /.../ Explaining how political thought makes sense in a 
specific country makes it easier for foreign observers in particular to understand the 
country.’ Thus, although not every single decision fits the pattern to be expected from 
the structures used in the analysis, ’there is sufficient pressure form the structures that 
policies do turn within a certain, specified margin onto the tracks to be expected’. (ibid., 
p. 28)   
2.5. RESEARCH DESIGN  
Lene Hansen (2006, p. 65) suggests that in order to make full use of poststructuralist 
discourse analysis one has to make the following important choices when outlining a 
research project: 
1) whether it is more profitable to stick to official discourse or to expand the 
scope to include ’the political opposition, the media and marginal discourse;  
2) whether one needs to examine the discourse of one Self or or multiple Selves;  
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3) whether one should select one particular moment or a longer development;  
4) whether it is necessary to study one specific event/issue or multiple events;  
5) which material should be selected for a reliable analysis (see next section).   
In order to meet the aims of this research project, I have chosen to conduct a discourse 
analysis that concentrates on official discourse. Since ’national security’ is the central 
concept of this analysis, I assume that ’the state’ (but also ’the nation’) is the referent 
object of securitisation. Hence, as Wæver notes, the securitising move is made most 
probably by political elites – security matters are a question of emergency and survival.  
  Second, I have opted for a multiple-Self research design. Again – I believe this 
fits the research aims and helps to elucidate the patterns of difference and similarity in 
the discursive structures of the cases. As Lene Hansen points out, the cases should be 
chosen so that it is ’politically and analytically pregnant’ – thus, the cases can be 
selected according to what is the most common discourse or what are the most radical 
ones. I would say the selection for this study meets both options: at first glance, the 
cases represent in a rather radical way a wider array of national security discourses (in 
Europe) related to the Ukrainian crisis.  
  The choice of the cases has also been motivated by their relevance in terms of the 
reaction to the Ukrainian crisis, but most importantly, it follows the logic of 
MSDS/MDSS research design. The analysis is based on the presumption that two of the 
chosen cases – Estonia and Finland – are usually considered to be quite similar, whereas 
the Russian case significantly differs from the former two. Both Estonia and Finland are 
relatively small states in terms of their territory, population and economy, whereas 
Russia is one of the biggest states in the world. Both Estonia and Finland are relatively 
young as states, are members of the EU and are neighbours of Russia, whereas Russia is 
not a member of the EU and has a long history of statehood. Nevertheless, the 
discursive structures of the cases in national security matters in the context of the 
Ukrainian crisis do not follow the same outline. Although at first glance, there might be 
more content-related similarities between Finland and Estonia, the analysis points to 
structural similarities and differences. The structures of national security discourses of 
Finland and Estonia differ significantly, moreover, Estonian security discourse appears 
to share more similarities with its Russian counterpart. The analysis aims to discuss 
these similarities and differences in more detail.   
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  Third, in temporal terms, this study has been designed as a one-moment study that 
concentrates on the period Ukrainian crisis. As Lene Hansen (2006, p. 65) notes, much 
of the poststructuralist discourse analysis has focused on analysing striking moments 
such as conflicts and wars. I argue that the Ukrainian crisis, a major conflict that takes 
place very near (physically and symbolically) to the chosen countries, could in a rather 
radical way elucidate the underpinnings of the discursive structures of national security, 
and thus, makes an interesting temporal context for the study. Although the starting date 
of the crisis can be set to late autumn 2013 and it reached its peak in winter 2014 with 
the Crimean crisis, its prelude can be seen as dating back to August 2013. This has been 
taken into account when selecting the data.   
  Fourth, the term ’event’ is rather broadly defined by Lene Hansen – she suggests 
that a policy issue is usually chosen as the event. This study can thus be established as a 
one-moment study that concentrates on national security discourse and in a way, but 
only through the lens of national discourse and as a part of it, also on the European 
security discourse.  
  Thus, on may conclude that the research has been designed by reflecting upon all 
the possible choices proposed by Lene Hansen and therefore meets the basic criteria for 
a viable research design for a poststructuralist security analysis.   
2.6. DATA COLLECTION  
This section explains the collection of data for the research project. Lene Hansen (2006, 
p. 74) stresses that poststructuralist discourse analysis is characterised by an 
epistemological and methodological preference of the study of primary texts. In the case 
of official discourse, such texts can include official statements, speeches and interviews.   
  As a methodological principle, it is necessary to select the material according to 
two main considerations (Hansen, 2006, pp. 73-4):  
1) the majority of texts should be taken from the time under study;  
2) data collection should include key texts that function as nodes within the 
intertextual web of debate, but also a larger body of general material that sets a basis 
for a more quantitative view of the dominant discourses.  
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Furthermore, if the project concentrates on the time of study (as opposed to historical 
material), the material should correspond to three specific criteria: it should include 
clear articulations, be widely read and attended to and, finally, have formal authority 
(ibidem).  
  I have aimed to take all of these principles and criteria into account when 
selecting the data for this research project. The data has been taken from the official 
sources, more specifically from the presidential and governmental websites (Prime 
Ministers, Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers). In some cases, the websites provide 
keywords (’security’ or ’national security’) according to which respective data could 
easily be found. Nonetheless, that is not so in all cases – thus, in order to give more 
substance to the selection I conducted a ’manual search’ in all cases, going through the 
lists of data and identifying data that concerned national security or the situation in 
Ukraine. In addition, the ’manual search’ was also motivated by the idea of the 
Copenhagen School according to which the word ’security’ does not explicitly need to 
be expressed in order to make something a security issue. The focus was set on policy 
speeches – according to Lene Hansen (2006, pp. 74-5), these are considered to be the 
most relevant and fruitful documents to analyse in terms of clear articulations, wide 
attention and formal authority. Also, priority was given to interviews published on 
official websites – interview is a good genre to explain one’s policy positions. Although 
analysing the interviews published in the (unofficial) media could be problematic with 
regard to the focus on official discourse, I assume that publication on the official 
website transforms interviews into viable data reliably representing official discourse.  
  While official discourse is also transmitted through other media, I have 
deliberately opted for a more strict selection for several reasons. First, the information 
published on the official websites can in my opinion considered to be “the purest” and 
thus the most reliable in terms of representing the official discourse. Other media 
sources can often distort official articulations by omitting parts of them, adding 
comments or changing the wording. Although other sources are important in terms of 
disseminating official discourses, they often draw on positions, press releases and 
speeches that are (also) published on the official websites. In addition, as already said, 
many of the interviews given to the press are later published on the official websites.    
  Altogether, the data set consists of 218 texts, which in my view is enough to also 
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provide the analysis with a more ’quantitative’ quality, suggested by Lene Hansen. 
Nonetheless, the division of this material along the lines of the cases is somewhat 
problematic: Russia – 129, Estonia – 56, Finland – 33. This is due to the fact that 
Russian official sources provide a much larger set of data concerning national security. 
Nonetheless, the analysis shows that most of these texts are rather repetitive – as are 
those concerning the Finnish and the Estonian case. The nodal points and principal 
articulations of the texts can identified rather precisely without much effort. Thus, from 
that I would conclude that the data sets may not be equal in terms of quantity, but they 
are in quality, as all of them give a substantial and rather stable insight to the structures 
of the national security discourses of the three countries. Moreover, the data sets are not 
perfectly equal in terms of their inner division. The main difference concerns the 
addresses of national Defence Ministers – while the website of the Finnish Defence 
Ministry provides a number of official addresses, its Estonian and Russian counterparts 
do not (only brief press releases are provided). Nevertheless, since discourse analysis 
concentrates on published material, the texts, and does not aim to provide an analysis of 
what the sources ’secretly think’, I do not see this as a major deficiency, given that a 
country’s official discourse consists of what is publicly available.   
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3. CONSTRUCTION OF NATIONAL-LEVEL THREATS  
This chapter tackles the first level of the model proposed for foreign policy analysis by 
Wæver (2002). It attempts to identify the principle referent objects of threats that are 
constructed as directed towards the state or nation itself. Simultaneously, I discuss the 
relationship between ‘nation’ and ‘state’, as well as other processes of linking in 
constructing the Self of the discourses. Also, I address the question of how the Others 
are constructed in the discourses and assess whether the discourses rather tend to use a 
logic of equivalence or that of difference. The chapter is divided into three sections, 
according to the main security issues, all traditionally seen as characteristic of a (nation) 
state: right to self-determination, territorial integrity and the non-intervention.   
3.1. RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION  
  The question of a group’s or a nation’s right to self-determination is one of the 
central issues of national security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Both 
the Maidan movement and the Crimean case have provoked debates on the matter. I 
argue that Russia and Estonia approach this principle from a more fervid point of view 
than Finland, thus reaffirming and legitimising their polarised identity constructions.    
   In all security discourses, the most central issue regarding a nation’s or an ethnic 
group’s right to self-determination appears to be the question of Crimea and Maidan. 
Also, this issue is a good example for demonstrating the discrepancy between how 
different discourses ‘seem to be’ on the surface and how similar their underlying 
structures are. For Estonia, the most obvious referent object is the pro-European 
Ukraine that is largely connected to the Maidan protests and is seen as the entity whose 
right to self-determination is threatened: 
‘People on Maidan died due to sniper bullets because they wanted their state to assume 
a European direction.’ (Paet 5.03.2014)  
The Finnish position largely agrees with that of the EU and that of Estonia in terms of 
the positive meaning attributed to the Maidan movement, but at the same time tries to 
explain and understand Russia’s response to the Maidan movement:   
‘The Euro-Maidan movement was mainly a genuine popular uprising representing 
ordinary people tired with the old system – people demanding something more 
accountable and better instead.’ (Tuomioja 19.11.2014)  
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‘From Moscow, the prospective agreement with the EU looked like a step taken towards 
Europe and its social model and sphere of interest, and therefore seemed against the 
interests of Russia. So, when Ukraine's development took this turn via the Maidan 
protests, Russia drew its own conclusions and acted accordingly.’ (Niinistö 10.11.2014) 
In the Russian case, the referent objects are rather connected to the South East of 
Ukraine, the Russian-speaking population of the country and especially Crimea, 
whereas the Maidan movement is seen as resulting in a rise to power of far-right forces 
that jeopardise the right of minorities: 
‘Those so-called 'authorities' launched the scandalous law project concerning a 
revision of the language policy that directly repressed the rights of national minorities.’ 
(Putin 18.03.2014)    
  Thus, it first seems that Estonian and Finnish articulations are similar, while 
Russian discourse swaps meanings attributed to the parties and seems to demonstrate an 
opposite view. A closer look at the deeper structural patterns, on the other hand, reveals 
a different picture. Despite of seeming difference on the surface, Russian and Estonian 
discourses share a number of important structural similarities. Both discourses are 
polarised – they appear to be based on the assumption that the events of the Ukrainian 
crisis can roughly be described as a struggle between two parties, one of which is ‘right’ 
and the other one ‘wrong’ in its entirety. Finland, on the other hand, abstains from such 
a clear polarisation based on antagonistic assumptions and opts for a view that stems 
from the logic of difference rather than that of equivalence (e.g. Tuomioja 19.11.2014; 
Niinistö 10.11.2014). Rather, it appears to maintain a rather neutral position and 
emphasises a necessity of reconciliation between the parties. Russia and Estonia, 
although at times asserting that the conflict must be stopped, are keen to underline that 
nations, or often ‘the people’, have a right to determine their own path and fight for their 
rights.    
  While Finland remains rather distant in terms of the issue, Estonia and Russia 
demonstrate a high degree of protagonisation. Russia and Estonia clearly identify their 
Self with the party they hold to be right (Eastern Ukraine and Maidan respectively) and 
draw a link between their Self and the situation. Also, it is important to note that 
protagonisation is enhanced by historisation in both cases. Estonia sees Ukraine as 
fighting for the freedom to determine its own political course and compares it to its own 
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struggles throughout the history, especially so with regard to the annexation of Crimea 
(Ilves 23.06.2014; Rõivas 13.06.2014). Moreover, it is interesting to note that ‘the 
enemy’ is the same in both cases, which seems to make the issue even more personal for 
Estonia.  
  Much like its Estonian counterpart sees Maidan, Russian national security 
discourse depicts the events in Crimea as the attempt of the Crimean people to express 
their will to determine their political course of preference (Putin 17.04.2014 (1)). In 
Russian national security discourse the Self is obviously identified with the Crimean 
issue and more widely with Eastern Ukraine (cf. Brudny & Finkel, 2011). Moreover, 
Crimea is clearly depicted as a(n inseparable) part of Russia’s (historical) Self (Putin 
17.04.2014 (1); 9.05.2014 (2); see also Shevel, 2011). For instance, Vladimir Putin 
explicitly claims that Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia – thus, a 
threat towards Crimeans (that is, Russians), can by no means be overlooked (Putin 
18.03.2014).     
 Nonetheless, it is important to note that in both discourses, the right to self-
determination does not simply imply determining the political course of one’s 
preference, but the ‘correct’ course, which in the Estonian case is pro-European and in 
Russian case pro-Russian (e.g. see Putin 18.03.2014; Paet 5.03.2014), thus adding to the 
polarisation. For both Estonia and Russia, negative forces, as opposed to positive forces, 
do not have a right to self-determination – what ‘they’ stand for is considered to be 
wrong. Thus, ‘positive’ rules and rights only apply to the ‘positive’ parties. Hence, 
through this ‘normative’ aspect, the positive parties are injected with additional 
meaningfulness, they represent a broader spectrum of values and can be seen as symbols 
and carriers of positive meaning in the two discourses.  
  Similarly, although the negative parties of the conflict are more narrowly 
presented as ‘separatists’ in the Estonian discourse (e.g. Mikser 2.09.2014) and as ‘far-
right’, ‘nationalist’ or ‘fascist forces’ in the Russian discourse (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014), 
they are injected with additional meaning and act as symbols representing a wider array 
of enemies, i.e. radical Others, in both discourses, thus enhancing polarisation and 
antagonisation in the discourses. The negative parties of the conflict are seen as 
representations/reincarnations of historical and present enemies by the two countries. 
For instance, Estonia does not even question the fact that Russia is backing the 
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separatist forces, or rather, the Estonian discourse identifies separatists with Russia, to 
the extent that instead of addressing the issue of separatists, the emphasis is rather put 
on foreign armed forces (e.g. Mikser 2.09.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014). In Russian view, 
the ‘fascist’ Maidan forces and the ‘far-right’ government of Kiev are supported by the 
West, more specifically by the US (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014; 4.06.2014). Although Russia 
does not explicitly state that Ukraine has been invaded by foreign forces, it does point at 
the fact that the Kievan extremists are trained by the US forces who are situated in 
Ukraine (e.g. Lavrov 28.07.2014). In addition, while Estonia underlines that Crimea has 
been annexed by Estonia’s (the Self’s) historical enemy whose aggressive nature ‘is 
hardly anything new’ (Rõivas 24.09.2014), Russian discourse mirrors it by pointing at 
the ‘fascist’ or ‘nazist’ government of Kiev that has seized power and prefigures a 
security threat to the peace-loving Crimeans (Putin 18.03.2014).  
  At the same time, Finland does not appear to be preoccupied with the enemy 
image and the correctness/falseness of ‘the nature’ of the parties. Rather, it is worried 
about the about the conflict of interests between the parties. Moreover, it is concerned 
about the nature of the conflict, which has surpassed the ideational level and reached a 
‘real’, armed-conflict-level (e.g. Niinistö 18.03.2014; 10.11.2014) that seems to be 
incompatible with Finnish discursive constructions of security. Indeed, it seems that 
Finland does not depict the events of the Ukrainian crisis as much as a threat to 
Ukraine’s right to self-determination, but rather to that of Europe as a whole – Europe is 
continuously articulated as a community of ‘peace’ and ‘cooperation’, threatened by the 
armed-conflict dynamics of the past, that were thought to have been surpassed a long 
time ago. Finland abstains from underlining the national aspect, but rather fears for the 
unity and peace within the continent. It fears that the security system of the EU can be 
further crippled by the crisis, and become an obstacle to Finland’s hopes of reinforcing 
the CSDP as an alternative to NATO. (e.g. Niinistö 29.04.2014; Stenlund 29.04.2014) 
Hence, for Finland the threat to self-determination is not directly projected towards 
some specific state, but rather to the European security system as a whole.  
  As for possible means to counter the threat, Russia and Estonia demand a 
solution from ‘the enemy’: the source of the threat is held responsible. In the Russian 
case it is the Ukrainian government that is obliged to provide more rights for the 
Russian-speaking population and abolish far-right and nationalist forces (e.g. Lavrov 
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13.02.2014; 30.03.2014). Estonian security discourse points at Russia as the party to be 
held responsible for hindering the self-determination of a pro-European Ukraine and 
subsequently the one that must provide solutions, e.g. guarantee the restitution of 
Crimea and withdrawal of troops from Eastern Ukraine (Ilves 6.06.2014). Additionally, 
possibly due to the high level of protagonisation, that is, almost making the Ukrainian 
issue ‘our issue’ by Estonia and Russia, from time to time the two discourses directly 
and indirectly suggest the necessity of personal intervention in the crisis (e.g. Ilves 
2.09.2014 (1); Putin 17.04.2014 (1)). Although Finland agrees that Russia, alongside 
Ukraine, is one of the parties that should take responsibility for providing a solution to 
the crisis, these claims are relatively mild, almost sympathetic, and do not contain any 
antagonisation (e.g. Stubb 3.09.2014). Moreover, Finland emphasises a need for an 
active dialogue between Ukraine and Russia (Stubb 12.03.2014), whereas Estonia rather 
advocates more radical measures such as punishing Russia via sanctions (Ilves 
2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). Thus, while Finland prefers cooperation and peaceful 
dialogue as inclusive reconciliatory measures vis-à-vis Russia, its southern neighbour 
promotes (an almost absolute) exclusion and estrangement of the Enemy and denies the 
possibility of a peaceful reconciliation. The radical difference between the two is thus 
evident.   
  To conclude, Estonian and Russian discourses depict the issue of self-
determination as more personal, whereas for Finland, it is a European issue rather than a 
national one. Russia and Estonia strongly polarise the issue and underline the inherent 
positivity and negativity of the parties, providing historical examples to justify their 
position. Although Finnish security discourse includes some mild polarisation, the 
articulations containing polarisation are balanced out with those that suggest a necessity 
for cooperation and reconciliation between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ parties. Overall, 
Finland remains much more neutral than its Estonian and Russian counterparts.  
3.2. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY  
This section aims to discuss another defining aspect of national sovereignty that 
emerges in all three security discourses: territorial integrity. As outlined in the previous 
chapter, the territory of a state is related to its ‘physical’ security. Thus, it is the 
palpable, well-defined, probably the most commonly emphasised aspect of the ‘state’ 
and usually considered to be of particularly high importance in security issues. The 
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question of territorial integrity has been quite acute in the context of the Ukrainian 
crisis, especially with regard to the annexation of Crimea by Russia. I further argue that 
in Russian and Estonian discourses, territorial security issues are not only seen as 
physical – for both, territory is a strong part of national identity and important in terms 
of reaffirming its Self. At the same time, I show that this is not the case with Finland, 
which remains relatively distanced as to territorial matters.   
  Both Estonian and Russian security discourses create a strong interlinkage 
between the nation (and its right to self-determination) and the territory, in other words, 
the discourses demonstrate an explicit sense of ownership of the territory of the relative 
state, to the extent that it becomes the territory of a nation, an integral part of national 
identity. At this point, it is perhaps useful to note that although in the Russian case, the 
question of nation and nationalism is infamously problematic, it seems to be rather 
uniform in terms of the Ukrainian crisis: all people(s) of Russia (and in some cases even 
all Russian-speakers) are presented as a part of the Russian nation (e.g. Putin 
17.04.2014 (1)).  
  The Russian construction of the Crimean events is an almost perfect example of 
a successful securitisation. First, a historical area of Russia where compatriots reside is 
depicted as existentially threatened by an enemy whose terrifying nature is further 
augmented by historisation. Thus, the mnemonical aspects of security enter the play. 
Namely, the enemy is far-right, or ‘fascist’. Moreover, as Russian authorities explain, 
due to the far-right regime, there is a serious threat of the historical Russian areas, 
symbols of Russian military glory, turning into NATO naval bases (Putin 17.04.2014 
(1)). The level of protagonisation is obvious, whereas multidimensional acts of 
historisation add cogency to the arguments. This, in turn, justifies the utilisation of 
extraordinary means to urgently counter the constructed threat. Subsequently to an 
‘effective response’ to the threat, the overall security perception of the public is 
augmented. (see Hansen, 1997) Moreover, this is not just ‘some threat’, but a ‘real and 
tangible’ threat to a historical Russian territory that turns the classical narrative of a 
nation returning to its sacred ‘promised land’ upside down and mirrors it. In the 
Crimean case, a part of homeland, a sacred territory, returns to the nation:    
’/.../ Crimea and Sevastopol have returned to their homeland. /.../ The people living 
here strongly affirmed their will to be together with Russia. By doing so, they confirmed 
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their commitment to the historical truth and to the memory of our ancestors.’ (Putin 
9.05.2014 (3)) 
The previous passage suggests that ‘the return of Crimea’ is constructed not simply as 
the ultimate and most victorious example of the Ukrainian Russian-speaking 
population’s self-determination. For Russia, Crimea is an integral part of its historical 
Self in its entirety, including its territory (e.g. Putin 18.03.2014; 17.04.2014 (1)). The 
return of Crimea is depicted as a manifestation of ’historical truth’, thus serving to 
enhance mnemonic security. This suggests that Crimea is seen as a part of Russia that 
has been one all along, even while being officially part of the Ukrainian territory. At the 
same time, in Russian national security discourse Crimea is of utmost importance as the 
symbol of Russian military glory (Putin 26.06.2014) that was ‘given away God knows 
why’ (Putin 17.04.2014(1)). This once again confirms that for Russia, it is not only a 
triumph of the Crimeans’ or Russian-speaking population’s right to self-determination, 
but of Russians and Russia. Thus, it could possibly be one of the explanations for the 
interchangeable use of ’Russians’ and ’Russian-speaking people’ in the articulations 
that concern Crimea. In Russian discourse, the Self is utterly protagonised with regard 
to this issue.  
  Quite similarly to Russia, Estonian security discourse tends to link nation, 
territory and history and identifies to a certain point, although not as straightforward as 
Russia, with the Crimean issue. Whereas Russian security discourse claims to have 
perceived a threat to a historical Russian area, according to Estonian security discourse, 
Crimea is a part of Ukrainian territory: thus, the territorial integrity of Ukraine is 
threatened (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014). As Russia points to historical enemies and personal 
experience, Estonia does the same. For instance, the President of Estonia has stated that 
in 1940 Estonians have experienced the same things that happened to Ukraine with 
reference to Crimea (Ilves 23.06.2014). Also, this aspect directly reaffirms the Estonian 
historical construction of Self and Other – ‘annexation’ is historically strongly 
connected to the Estonian ‘Self’ and to Russia as the enemy.    
  Although both Estonia and Finland use the term ’annexation’ to describe 
Russia’s actions in the peninsula (e.g. Ilves 23.06; Stenlund 29.04.2014), Finnish 
statements are characterised by a completely different degree of 
involvement/compassion and surely a different connotation. The following example 
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illustrates rather well the overall tone and intensity of the Finnish discourse concerning 
the Crimean matter:  
’Finland has condemned Russia’s actions both nationally and via the European Union. 
We have done so because of our values and our security. We know the history of our 
continent – we have seen enough of the justice of the stronger in Europe.’ (Stubb 
3.09.2014) 
Finland calls Russia’s actions ’justice of the stronger’ that has been seen often enough 
in Europe, but does not resort to pointing out Russia’s previous actions of the same 
character to illustrate its claims, nor does Finland use comparisons with other widely-
condemned historical regimes or events. This is certainly not the case with Estonia that 
goes significantly further in condemning Russia’s actions by repeatedly calling the 
annexation of Crimea an ’Anschluss’ and Russia an aggressor (e.g. Ilves 24.09.2014; 
14.11.2014). Also, the Estonian authorities point at the fact that the same excuse – a 
threat to compatriots abroad – was used by Hitler (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014): 
  
Currently, over 80% of Russians support the annexation of Crimea via a military 
aggression, whereby the Anschluss of the territory is justified with the compatriots 
living there – exactly like in 1938, when Adolf Hitler annexed Sudetenland. (Ilves 
2.09.2014 (1))  
Whilst the weight of comparisons with Hitler’s actions are most probably easily 
comprehensible to all European audiences, the question of compatriots gains even more 
relevance due to the Estonian context. Although the statement is not explicitly made at 
the official discursive level, using the word ‘compatriots’ gains troublesome resonance 
in the current Baltic context that is characterised by a high proportion of the Russian-
speaking population (that is, ‘compatriots’). The securitising move is enhanced by other 
articulations that include allusions to a possibility of Estonia facing the same fate as 
Ukraine (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014; 2.09.2014 (1)). Interestingly, Ilves also emphasises the 
fact that a large part of the Russian population supports the country’s unlawful actions, 
‘(m)oreover, antiliberal assaults of Western 'decadent tolerance', be it freedom of 
speech or the choice of partner, are gaining widespread support.’ (Ilves 2.09.2014 (1)) 
In a way, this can be seen as an expansion of the meaning of the term ’aggressor’ – 
Russia is portrayed not simply as an aggressive and intolerant state, but an aggressive 
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state whose actions are backed by ‘its people’, thus making the status quo even more 
‘hopeless’.    
  It is rather characteristic of Estonian national security discourse to merge the 
concepts of ’state’ and ’nation’ interchangeably when addressing security matters. 
Hence, similarly to what Russian security discourse reveals, this implies that territorial 
matters are not just connected to the state, but to the nation – a nation constitutes (and 
owns) the state. Due to the particularly strong, explicit and consistent linking of national 
identity and security matters in Estonian discourse, in the case of securitisation, territory 
ceases to be an administrative issue of the state, its meaning shifts and it becomes an 
issue of the nation, a question of national identity. Similarly to what the Russian 
security discourse reveals, there is a strong link between a nation’s right to self-
determination and territorial issues in the Estonian security discourse. For Estonia, 
regardless of the fact that the Crimean population is mostly Russian(-speaking), Crimea 
is a Ukrainian territory and belongs to the Ukrainian nation (cf. the case of Ida-Virumaa 
in Estonia). As Estonian security discourse protagonises itself and historises the 
Crimean issue, it becomes a question of Estonian national identity: the Ukrainian nation 
has been deprived of its territory, just like Estonia once was. On the other hand, this is 
also presented as a reminder to Self that threats still exist and serves as a legitimisation 
of the mnemonical security positions of Estonia. Moreover, merging nation and state in 
security matters also becomes clear through a recurrent use of ‘us’ to denote the whole  
nation in Russian and Estonian security discourses. The use of ‘us’ is much less 
frequent in Finnish discourse and does not refer as often to the Finnish state or nation, 
but to Europe or the EU. For instance, see the following examples:  
For us (the Western success-based values) are not enough. /.../ What is death? Death is 
terrible. No, together, even death is beautiful. /.../ This is where our we-feeling and 
family values stem from. Of course, we are less pragmatic, less calculating than 
representatives of other nations, but instead, we have a greater soul. (Putin 17.04.2014 
(1)) 
Is our life here, our freedom worth defending and bringing sacrifices? Only we can 
answer this question. /.../ Yes, it is our country where we decide and make our own 
choices. For some, we have been to successful, too independent, too wilful, too 
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European, too non-Soviet. /.../ Now I ask: are we ready? Are we willing to put a greater 
effort into defending our freedom? (Ilves 23.06.2014) 
It is clear that we have seen a harsh violation of collective and co-operative security in 
Europe. Our various institutionalized mechanisms have not been able to prevent the 
situation from escalating. /.../ Once the conflict has fully subsided – and I do hope that 
it will take place sooner rather than later – we must find ways to renew our 
commitments to common security in Europe. (Tuomioja 19.11.2014)  
  To recap, in Russian and Estonian cases, the territorial issue of Crimea is 
strongly linked to national identity of the Self, an inherently personal one. This view is 
reaffirmed and enhanced by constantly pointing at mnemonical issues, providing 
examples from history to legitimise the positions. While Finland condemns Russia’s 
actions in Crimea, it remains distant and abstains from protagonising itself in terms of 
the issue the issue, nor does it bring historical parallels. 
3.3. PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION  
  This section discusses the threats to the principle of non-intervention with a 
state’s internal affairs. I argue that in the more neutral Finnish discourse the principle is 
articulated as almost absolute, regarding all parties. In its Estonian and Russian 
polarised counterparts, on the other hand, it is suggested that the principle of non-
intervention only applies to the negative parties, whereas the positive parties are 
allowed and must intervene. The issue is further expanded in the second section under 
the subsection concerning geopolitical threats. 
  In all three discourses, non-intervention with Ukrainian issues is possibly the 
most evident referent object in terms of non-intervention matters. Nonetheless, again, 
the Finnish case can be distinguished from the other two in terms of its neutrality: the 
principle of non-intervention with Ukrainian internal policies is presented as being on 
the verge of absolute. Although positions made by Finland express explicit concern 
about Russia’s interference with Ukrainian domestic affairs, such as supporting the 
separatists (e.g. Stubb 3.09.2014; Tuomioja 27.03.2014), it is repeatedly underlined that 
Ukraine should make decisions on its own, without direct interference from the 
European Union or Russia (e.g. Stenlund 29.04.2014, Stubb 12.03.2014). As an 
illustration of this tendency, I suggest the following passage:  
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‘Defining the future of Ukraine belongs to Ukraine itself. /.../ A meaningful dialogue 
between Russia and Ukraine must be established. Relations with the EU, as well as 
relations with Russia, will both be important for Ukraine, also in the future.’ (Stenlund 
29.04.2014) 
The passage demonstrates rather well the neutrality of Finnish articulations, which is 
twofold: first, Ukraine is expected to tackle the issue on its own, without any external 
interference from the EU or Russia, and second, Ukraine is advised to try and maintain 
good relations with both, despite the events in Crimea.  
  Estonia and Russia clearly differ from Finland in terms of the lack of neutrality 
in their articulations. Again, both discourses demonstrate a clear polarisation. In 
Estonian discourse, unsurprisingly, Russia is depicted as a violator of the principle, 
whilst the West is portrayed as a necessary facilitator of positive developments in 
internal affairs (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). In Russian discourse the roles 
have been exchanged: the West has been injected with a negative meaning and Russia 
with a positive one. The West is very often depicted as a supporter of ‘extremists’ in 
Ukraine (Lavrov 19.02.2014; Putin 4.06.2014), whereas Russia is seen as the main 
contributor to positive solutions. It is explicitly affirmed by the Russian authorities that 
the EU Association Agreement was aimed to ’drag’ Ukraine into the EU’s sphere of 
influence, whereas Russia supports protecting the rights of Ukraine to make its own 
decisions (Lavrov 13.02.2014). According to Estonian authorities, Russia has interfered 
with the European integration of Ukraine with the intention of keeping Ukraine in its 
sphere of influence, is encouraging and supporting separatist movements and has even 
started the Ukrainian crisis (Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). This allows one to 
conclude that – once again – both cases point at the opposition between a positive party 
of the conflict and its negative counterpart. Moreover, the articulations in both 
discourses demonstrate that the principle of non-intervention only concerns the negative 
party, whereas the positive party has the right to, or even should intervene.   
  In addition, a high level of protagonisation of Self concerning non-intervention 
with Ukrainian internal affairs can be detected in both cases. For instance, see the 
following example: 
’There is a war going on in Ukraine. It was started by a country whose border is just a 
few hundred kilometres away from Tallinn.’ (Ilves 8.09.2014)  
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The President of Estonia retains it necessary to point out that the state that started a war 
in Ukraine is very near to Estonia. Despite the fact that Finland is also a neighbouring 
state of Russia, it does not make any concerned statements of such kind and limits itself 
to troublesomely pointing out the proximity of the conflict zone, while successfully 
maintaining its overall neutrality (e.g. Niinistö 10.11.2014). Estonia, on the other hand, 
directly emphasises ‘the threat’ coming from Russia.   
  Likewise, Russia is keen to protagonise itself with regard to the issues 
concerning the principle of non-intervention in Ukraine. It is quite evident that Russian 
security discourse depicts Ukraine (especially its Eastern regions) as a part of Self. 
Russian authorities underline that Ukrainians and Russians are ethnically very close – 
moreover, it is explicitly said that they are the same nation (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1); 
18.03.2015). Additionally, Russian authorities emphasise their duty to protect Russian-
speaking/Russian people (again, the terms are used rather interchangeably) in Ukraine 
(e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1)). Such statements articulate a close bond between the two 
countries and nations, one that goes beyond simply being friendly with each other. As 
already shown in the previous sections, Ukraine, especially its Eastern regions and 
Crimea, are a part of Russian national identity. Indeed, an intervention with the issues of 
the Self is not subject to the principle of non-intervention.   
  To sum up, regardless of the fact that Finland might seem to use a certain 
amount of polarisation when it condemns Russia’s support to Ukrainian separatists, it 
actually appears to condemn an intervention of any kind and from whichever party. 
Russia and Estonia, on the other hand, fully support the principle non-intervention as to 
the ‘enemy’, but suggest that ‘positive’ parties should intervene in order to guarantee 
that the principle is followed by the negative party.  
 
 
4. CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN-LEVEL THREATS  
According to the idea of a ‘layered’ framework for studying security, in order to more 
successfully analyse threats to national security, one should also include a more 
‘general’, i.e. European level of national discourses. Studying this level becomes 
especially important considering the proximity of the conflict zone in Ukraine to the 
three countries in question. The Ukrainian crisis is taking place in Europe and its 
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implications to how the European security system is understood can hardly be 
underestimated. The objects of the threats that the European Self – as depicted by the 
national discourses – faces are discussed in two sections: values and stability. Hereby it 
is useful to remind that these issues are strongly intertwined. 
4.1. VALUES  
Although the question of common European values was widely discussed already 
before the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis and is sometimes listed among reasons of it, 
the issues concerning rather abstract nodal points, such as the failure of democratic 
principles, deficit of trust and a lack of unity, are central in the context of the Ukrainian 
events. The subsection argues that despite the fact that all three countries express their 
concern about the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on the common values, the 
articulations in the cases demonstrate a significant difference. For Finland, the values in 
question are unexceptionally European, whereas Russia and Estonia tend to protagonise 
themselves, leaving an impression that the values are theirs, or at least that they are 
showing an exceptional example in terms of protecting and representing them.   
  First, three examples of articulations concerning the issue of values is 
worthwhile to be observed:  
’/.../ Our common values are trespassed upon.’ (Niinistö 26.08.2014)  
’There is a battle going on /.../ over values, but also over the meaning of human rights 
and democracy.' (Ilves 24.02.2014)  
’A competition over values is going on.’ (Lavrov 20.03.2014)  
First of all, these three examples immediately reveal a fundamental difference between 
the Finnish security discourse and its Estonian and Russian counterparts. Namely, 
whilst according to the Finnish more passive construction, the common values have 
simply been ‘trespassed upon’, Estonia and Russia describe the situation as active: there 
is a ‘competition’ or even a ‘battle’ going on. Hereby the choice of words does not 
occur as occasional, but represents a recurrent position.   
  In the Finnish case, the analysis of the security discourse reveals that the 
common values referred to in the previous statement are first and foremost European 
(and not primarily Western) (e.g. Niinistö 13.05.2014). Nonetheless, the question as to 
who is the main trespasser still remains rather ambiguous and it is not specified who and 
what is meant by Europe. For instance, as to the Crimean case, Finnish authorities point 
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out that Russia has violated common principles, but at the same time it is emphasised 
that the Ukrainian authorities are the main party responsible for ending the crisis (e.g. 
Stenlund 29.04.2014). For Estonia and Russia, that of values is one of the major issues 
catalysing the Ukrainian crisis – it is explicitly pointed out in both discourses that the 
crisis is a battle over values. Such construction, in turn, once again exemplifies a high 
degree of polarisation concerning the security issues in the two discourses. For Estonia, 
the parties competing are Russia and the West, in Russian case – at first glance – they 
appear to be the same. Nonetheless, the Russian case is somewhat more complicated in 
terms of the actual signified. It is important to note that Russia often uses the signifiers 
‘the West’, ‘NATO’ and ‘the US’ interchangeably, whereas the former two are most 
often used to denote (the political direction of) the US.  
  The polarisation in Estonian and Russian discourses is also similar in terms of 
making a radical distinction not simply between two parties, but one between the parties 
as representatives and protectors of positive and negative values – some articulations 
even refer to positive and negative values as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ ones and thereby not 
simply antagonise, but rather demonise the Other. For instance, the Russian discourse 
suggests that the US, that is depicted as the main enemy of positive (Russian) values, is 
’on the verge of good and evil’ (Lavrov 14.06.2014). The Estonian discourse mirrors its 
Russian counterpart: Russia is not only depicted as an enemy of the European values 
(that are depicted as ’good’), but also explicitly (and repeatedly) described as some sort 
of a ‘force of evil’ (sic!) with whom all deals are excluded (Ilves 25.03.2014; 
13.05.2014). For Estonia, Russia appears to be a historical enemy, one that cannot be 
transformed and is not only seen as a representative of the ‘evil’ forces in this specific 
case, but is almost evil by nature (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014). Generally, 
Russian national security discourse suggests that the West is in decline first and 
foremost because it has neglected its traditional values and does not have anything 
sacred (Putin 4.03.2014).    
  The Self, on the other hand, is exclusively inscribed with a positive connotation 
in Estonian and Russian discourses. Both Russia and Estonia tend to highly protagonise 
themselves with respect to the issue, as opposed to Finland that abstains from 
mentioning itself in this context and rather discusses the European values as strictly 
European, thereby distancing itself from the possible ‘competition’ or ‘battle’ (e.g. 
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Niinistö 24.09.2015; 12.01.2015). As to Estonia, the Ukrainian crisis seems to have 
provided it with an opportunity to legitimise its continuous securitisation of the Russian 
issues. For example, Estonian authorities have emphasised that Estonia was among the 
few states that could foresee what Russia was capable of before no-one suspected 
anything of that kind (e.g. Ilves 6.06.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014). The Ukrainian crisis 
has strongly brought forth the long-time personal opposition with Russia, which is one 
of the main foundations of Estonian national security discourse, also value-wise. Thus, 
this context offers grounds for the polarised structure of Estonian national identity to be 
reaffirmed and the securitisation of Russia to receive further legitimation. Russia is 
depicted as the embodiment of everything negative, untimely and corrupt, whereas 
Estonia is a new state with firm values, even more different from Russia than the other 
countries, especially some of the other ex-Soviet states (e.g. Ilves 1.05.2014). This can 
be perfectly illustrated with a rather provocative statement made by the President of 
Estonia during the Victory day parade, that even linguistically demonstrates an explicit 
confrontation between ‘us’ and ‘them’:  
’We are exactly what our neighbouring state considers to be an existential threat to 
itself. Estonia and Latvia are the countries that according to those people embody the 
greatest catastrophe of the 20th century.’ (Ilves 23.06.2014)   
  In terms of protagonisation, Russian security discourse demonstrates significant 
structural similarities with its Estonian counterpart. A clear border between the values 
of the Self and those of the Others is created. Russian nation is described as different 
from all the rest, but at the same time positively special. Vladimir Putin (Putin 
17.04.2014 (1)) suggests that Russian people have a particularly strong gene pool and 
continues with a celebration of the nature of the Russian people who, according to him, 
have higher moral values than the Western people. Russia portrays itself as a protector 
of these values, possibly even the only one left (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014; 4.06.2014). As to 
democracy, Russian authorities claim that the democratic regime of Russia is a ’normal 
democracy’ that just has its own specificities, as opposed to the the Western 
understanding of democracy which is described as ’strange’ (Lavrov 9.04.2014). It is 
underlined that the Russian way is the correct one, albeit it somewhat differs from the 
rest – nonetheless, this difference is positive and makes Russia more special. These 
‘Russian’ values seem to be portrayed as superior to the Western values, an integral 
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feature of the Self, correct and unchangeable (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1)).  
  In addition, Estonian and Russian security discourses share the tendency of 
historising the question of values, to the extent that they become inseparable from Self, 
but also the radical Other. For example, the President of Russia states that while 
Western people are individualist by nature, Russians are characterised by an inherent 
will to die for their Fatherland, as demonstrated by the history:  
’And here are the deep roots of our patriotism. This brings us to mass heroism during 
military conflicts and wars. /.../ Of course, we are less pragmatic /.../ than 
representatives of other nations, but then we are characterised by a greatness of soul .' 
(ibidem)  
  Similarly to Russia, Estonia tends to merge patriotic values, the nature of the 
Estonian people and security within its national security discourse. Although the 
articulations may not be as bold as the Russian ones, the discourse still reveals that 
freedom, love for Fatherland and the will to sacrifice something for the sake of these is 
considered to be a positive historically inherent trait of Estonian people (e.g. Ilves 
23.06.2014).   
  As already pointed out above, Finland does not emphasise the differences 
between Russia and the West, but is rather concerned about the mutual relationship – 
Finland underlines that ’Russia and the West have gone down a ’spiral of mistrust’ 
(Niinistö 26.08.2014). Finnish national security discourse emphasises a necessity to also 
understand ‘the other parties’, whereby Russia is meant. Thus, one may conclude that 
according to Finland, there is no battle going on over values – there are just differences 
between Russia and the West, but these can be overcome. As Alexander Stubb, the 
Prime Minister of Finland puts it:   
’Today, it would be fair to admit that Russia’s political system will not turn into a 
European democracy like ours. /.../ I believe we can co-exist. We need not be alike to be 
good neighbours, or even strategic partners again.’ (Stubb 29.09.2014)  
This statement is also confirmed by the President of Finland, Sauli Niinistö, who often 
points out that although the situation is serious, the EU must not take only its own 
interests into account, but also pay attention to other actors (e.g. Niinistö 26.08.2014). 
This permits one to conclude that Finland is rather worried about the mutual trust-based 
relations between Russia and the West. Russia is still seen as a neighbour that will 
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always exist and must therefore be interacted with in the best possible way (e.g. Stubb 
12.03.2014; 29.09.2014). Once again it is worthwhile noting that Finland does not 
underline any differences concerning ’the nature’ of any parties. It only seems to 
concentrate on relations and actions, not any particular characteristics – a pragmatic 
approach, as opposed to a patriotic/emotional one is strongly favoured. The articulations 
regarding the values seem to regards first and foremost not the national, but the 
common European identity.    
  As to measures to counter the threat, Estonia does not consider a peaceful and 
friendly solution to this ’battle of values’, nor does it express particular concern about 
the deficit of trust – Russia is seen as an actor that cannot be trusted anyway. The only 
way to overcome it is by effectively punishing the aggressor, the ’evil force’ (e.g. Ilves 
2.09.2014; 26.09.2014). Whilst Estonia excludes all deals with the devil, Russia and 
Finland declare a will to overcome the differences and underline the need for 
acceptance (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1); Stubb 29.09.2014). In the Russian case, this is 
articulated to a lesser extent, in the Finnish case it appears to be one of the most salient 
articulations. Nonetheless, it is important to note that for Russia, the reconciliation 
could possibly take place only between Russia and the member states of the EU, not 
with the US – the latter is depicted as constantly hindering the cooperation within 
Europe. Thus, since Europe is seen as a passive entity, as opposed to the US which is 
seen as a direct enemy, the seeming similarity does not go beneath the surface.  
 Overall, the analysis suggests that Russian and Estonian discourses are more 
keen than Finland to inscribe positive values to Self and negative ones to ‘the enemy’ 
and historise this tendency, thus portraying the distinction almost as an inherent one. 
The context and the issue are particularly fruitful for reaffirming the constructions of 
national identity. The Finnish discourse does not protagonise its Self, but rather stays on 
the European level in its articulations. It explicitly offers to accept the differences 
between Russia and the West, nonetheless, again, suggesting that this need not hinder 
the cooperation between the two. 
4.2. STABILITY  
Threats to stability in Europe are possibly among the most salient concerns emerged in 
the security discourses in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Articulations on the 
changing security situation in Europe have become very common, whereas stability is 
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very often considered to be the basis of the (former) European status quo. The section is 
divided into two subsections that tackle the principal threat constructions concerning the 
stability in Europe: geopolitical interests/ruining the balance of powers and radicalism 
in Europe.  
4.2.1. GEOPOLITICAL THREATS 
The Ukrainian crisis has brought to surface a number of acute geopolitical issues which 
are certainly not overlooked by any of the cases in question. This subsection argues that 
although Finland polarises the geopolitical issue more than the other threats hereby 
analysed, it mostly ‘filters’ threats and solutions to thereof through Europe and tends to 
generalise the matter. Russia and Estonia, on the other hand, meet the expectations 
based on the pattern revealed in the previous sections – while discussing the geopolitical 
threats to stability in Europe, they still manage to protagonise themselves in relation to 
the issue, so that the threat is not depicted as directed towards Europe, but a narrower 
national Self.   
  First, it is necessary to point out that in this particular issue, Finland 
demonstrates a much higher degree of polarisation than concerning other threats. 
Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja has repeatedly underlined the existence of two types 
of worlds: the world of interdependence (which has a positive connotation) and the 
world of power politics (which has a negative connotation) (e.g. Tuomioja 22.10.2014; 
19.11.2014). The EU is seen as a representative of the former, whereas Russia is 
(although in a relatively mild manner) described as the representative of the latter. The 
current crisis is depicted as a struggle between the two worlds – the world of power 
politics is seen as the enemy. (ibidem) Nonetheless, the above being the clearest 
example of a polarised articulation, the nature of the rhetoric concerning Finland’s 
general threat constructions seems to be relatively neutral: rather than being concerned 
with a constant personification of its enemies, it still appears to see instability and 
conflict in general as the principal source of threat. This is emphasised by the constantly 
articulated need for collaboration, as opposed to punishment: Finland considers a 
peaceful dialogue with Russia and the resulting political solution to be the only feasible 
option (e.g. Stubb 12.03.2014; 3.10.2014). The construction of the situation, as opposed 
to a particular actor, as a threat is reconfirmed by the fact that even the presence of  
  
47 
 
NATO forces, a long-time partner to Finland, in the nearby region is depicted as a 
security threat: 
’The general increase in tension can also be seen in the Baltic region, our neighbouring 
area. So far, this is more a question of the effects of the crisis rippling out into the 
Baltic region, rather than of the area becoming unstable itself. However, quite 
understandably, even this is being viewed as a cause for concern, since an active 
military presence in our neighbouring region – which was still an everyday fact of life 
in the 1980s – seemed to have become a thing of the past.’ (Niinistö 10.11.2014)  
Although Russia is occasionally depicted as a negative party in this issue, it seems to be 
considered a matter of the particular crisis, rather than a question of Russia’s nature. In 
Finnish discourse, instability itself is the real enemy.  
  In Estonian and Russian discourses, on the other hand, the issue is almost 
unexceptionally polarised and antagonised. Both discourses suggest that a specific 
negative Other (or the enemy) and a positive Self can be identified with regard to the 
geopolitical matters in Europe, whereas the EU is rather depicted as a mere spectator 
than a real actor in the security realm – as opposed to the active positive Self. In the 
Russian case, the US is the principal malicious Other, whereas in the Estonian case it is 
Russia. As to Self, in the Russian case it is (obviously) Russia, while for Estonia, it is 
most often NATO (alongside Estonia itself).   
  In Russia’s view, the source of the threat can be traced to the US-led West that is 
obviously playing geopolitical zero-sum games, hindering all possibilities for 
partnership and attempting to undermine the progress towards a more multipolar world 
(e.g. Lavrov 23.03.2014; 25.10.2014). More specifically, this source manifests itself 
through international organisations (especially the EU) and military alliances 
(particularly NATO) that hinder sovereign action of states and thus contribute to 
instability. With regard to this, it may be useful to remind that in Russian discourse the 
US is seen as the force shaping the values and actions of the West, as well as those of 
NATO. From the Russian point of view, Europe is as a mere puppet of the US, one that 
has lost its personal values, whereas the US is described as a double-faced liar of a 
country (e.g. Lavrov 14.06.2014). Overall, the US is openly described as the main 
advocate for unipolarity, spheres of influence, and hence, the actions of the US are seen 
as the main threat to stability in Europe by Russia (e.g. Putin 17.04.2014 (1); cf. Smith, 
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2013).    
  Russia condemns the existence of military alliances, especially the presence of 
NATO in Europe. The unacceptability of NATO, which is seen as the as the extension 
of the power of the US, has very often been articulated during the Ukrainian crisis. 
Hereby, Russia appears to insist that this very existence of NATO is almost directed 
against Russia (e.g. Lavrov 11.04.2014; Putin 4.03.2014). Nothing positive is associated 
with NATO in Russian security discourse. NATO is openly considered to be a liar, 
untrustworthy, outdated, aggressive and unwilling to collaborate (e.g. Lavrov 
11.04.2014; Putin 17.04.2014 (1)).   
  According to Russia, the greatest manifestations and confirmations of the 
geopolitical ambitions of the West are the enlargement of NATO and the Eastern 
Partnership of the European Union (Lavrov 8.04.2014; 11.04.2014). Moreover, these 
threats are also considered to be the reasons triggering the Ukrainian crisis:  
’The Ukrainian crisis is the result of the policy /.../ of the Western countries that is 
aimed to strengthen their own security on the expense of the others and expand the 
geopolitical sphere under their control.’ (Lavrov 19.10.2014)  
Hereby, it is also important to note that the US is considered to be behind both of the 
projects (e.g. Lavrov 11.04.2014).    
  Estonian security discourse turns the tables and points at Russia as the sole 
culprit in terms of playing geopolitical games, ruining the balance of powers and 
hindering progress in the European security system. Estonian authorities point out that 
the world is currently seeing an ’emergence of cynical geopolitics’ (Ilves 26.09.2014), a 
’revival of fascism, imperialist and racist geopolitical fantasies’ in Russia (Ilves 
2.09.2014).  Russia is among else often being referred to as an ’aggressive neighbour’ 
(Rõivas 24.09.2014), ’aggressor’ and ’propagandist revisionist neighbour’ who does not 
think that the European security order of the last 25 years should persist, but believes 
instead that ’tolerance is decadence’ (Ilves 23.06.2014). Similarly to Russian discourse 
on the US, negative expressions referring to conducting power politics are very often 
used with reference to the enemy – e.g. ’might makes right’, ’crude force’ et alia (e.g. 
Ilves 1.05.2014; Rõivas 24.09.2014).   
  Both Estonia and Russia tend to augment such statements by bringing historical 
parallels. For instance, in the Estonian discourse Russia is compared to totalitarian 
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regimes such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin (Ilves 23.08.2014; 
24.09.2014): 
’Russia wants to re-establish the spheres of influence with its Stalin-like politics of 
violence and fear.’ (Ilves 23.08.2014)   
As for Russia, it openly considers the existence of NATO in the current security context 
to be incomprehensible and unacceptable – NATO is seen as an rudiment of the Cold 
War era (Lavrov 4.08.2014), which still acts accordingly (Lavrov 28.09.2014).  
  Additionally, both see the current moment as a certain point of no return, the 
moment of revelation when the Enemy exposes its true intentions. Russian security 
discourse repeatedly underlines that the relations between Russia and the West have 
reached a certain (negative) moment of truth (Lavrov 23.03.2014; 25.10.2014). Estonian 
national security discourse repeatedly describes the current security situation as ’the end 
of an era’ (Ilves 6.06.2014; 2.09.2014). Estonian authorities grimly point out that the 
West has tried to build a ’world of eternal peace’, but this has proven to be impossible. 
As Toomas Hendrik Ilves (6.06.2014) puts it:   
’Love, peace and Woodstock are over. Altamont just happened.’  
  As to the possible role of the EU, the cases demonstrate different positions. 
Finland identifies with the EU and sees the EU as the most important guarantor of peace 
and security in Europe. Finland often suggests that Europe must start to put an emphasis 
on the CSDP that for a long time has been neglected. Finnish authorities stress that 
’there is still hope’ for a European security project and call for action to launch an active 
building of one. (e.g. Tuomioja 10.10.2014; 19.11.2014) The Nordic Defence 
Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is also seen as vital, whereas the question of NATO is 
addressed with caution (e.g. Niinistö 12.01.2014; Haglund 15.09.2014).  
  Both Russia and Estonia describe Europe/the EU as being too weak to counter 
geopolitical threats, or in the Russian case, even to voice its opinion. Thus, even Estonia 
distances itself from the EU in security matters as the organisation’s weak side. 
Moreover, in both cases it is believed that the Enemy is the source of weakness. In 
Russian security discourse, the EU is rather depicted as a set of dependent states that 
have given up their sovereignty and now follow (or even take orders) from the US (e.g. 
Putin 4.06.2014; 22.07.2014). In fact, the member states of the EU are regarded as 
objects/tools through which the US manifests and strengthens its positions – a set of 
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states that ’cannot even formulate a clear position’ (Putin 17.04.2014 (1)):  
'/.../ Many countries of the Western world /.../ have deliberately given up a considerable 
part of their sovereignty. /.../ It is hard to negotiate with them, because they are afraid 
that Americans are eavesdropping on them. /.../ It is not a joke. /.../’ (Putin 17.04.2014 
(1))  
Estonia agrees with Russia in terms of the EU being too weak and indecisive to counter 
the geopolitical threats that the continent is facing. According to Estonia, the EU is 
currently unable to provide viable measures to counter geopolitical threats of the 
continent, because its member states are too apprehensive of their relations with Russia 
(e.g. Ilves 6.06.2014; 2.09.2014) and overall tend to neglect national security issues. By 
countering the threats, Estonia means using deterrence and punishment – both directed 
towards Russia (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Mikser 11.09.2014).   
  Thus, quite interestingly, Estonian security discourse distances its Self from 
Europe. It is often emphasised that as to the security realm, Estonia is different from 
many European countries whose defence expenditures are not sufficient and that have 
been reluctant to join NATO (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014). Paradoxically, although threats are 
constructed as extremely tangible and serious, also the sense of security appears to have 
become stronger throughout the crisis. It seems that the Ukrainian crisis has increased 
the Estonian ’we-feeling’ in the security realm – the Self of Estonia has now truly 
become a part of a larger Self, whereas the membership of NATO has further been 
legitimised. For instance, just after the annexation of Crimea, the Minister of Defence 
explicitly stated: ’Today we are safer than ever.’ (Reinsalu 19.03.2014) This could be 
seen as an illustration of how the relationship between the ontological and physical 
security of a state can be contradictory – regardless of the fact that Estonia might sense 
a physical threat coming from Russia, it does not ‘tune down’ its statements and, 
instead, feels that its sense of Self, which maintains itself through routinised practices, 
has been strengthened.    
  As for the possible ways to strengthen security in Europe, both Estonia and 
Russia suggest a cooperation of European countries with an extra-EU actor, which in 
both cases is Self or strongly related to the Self in the particular issue. Simultaneously, 
the Self is depicted as the antipode of the Enemy and as a symbol of security. Thus, as a 
solution, Russia suggests a cooperation between European countries and Russia that 
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would establish stability in Europe and subsequently in the whole world:   
’The historical experience demonstrates that attempts to isolate Russia have brought to 
serious consequences for all Europe and vice versa: active inclusion of our country into 
the matters of our continent have been accompanied by lengthy periods of peace and 
development.’ (Lavrov 23.03.2014)  
For Estonia, the transatlantic cooperation is the key to geopolitical stability in Europe. 
Therefore, according to Estonia, the presence of NATO in Europe should be further 
strengthened (e.g. Mikser 2.09.2014).   
  To sum up, the analysis of one of the most salient issues in the context of the 
Ukrainian crisis has once again demonstrated that the structural similarities and 
differences follow a pattern much like in the previously discussed issues. Although 
Finnish discourse demonstrates a visible degree of polarisation, it is still rather mild 
compared to that encountered in Russian and Estonian discourses. Interestingly, 
although a member of the European Union, Estonia appears to agree with Russia in 
terms of the EU alone being too weak and indecisive to counter the geopolitical threats. 
Thus, again, Finland rather depicts geopolitical threats through a more European prism, 
while Russia and Estonia project threats to their Selves and use them to reaffirm the 
constructions of their national identity.  
4.2.2. RADICALISM  
Although radicalism has become one of the main objects of securitisation already before 
the Ukrainian crisis broke out, the crisis has surely had a catalysing effect: once again 
radicalism is widely seen as a serious security threat to stability in Europe. I argue that 
by attributing negative radicalism to their Others and at the same time claiming to 
oppose it, Estonia, and in particular, Russia reaffirm their polarised identity 
construction, while Finland again remains relatively distant.   
  First, it is necessary to mention that Finland does not address the issue nearly as 
often as Estonia and Russia do. These rare articulations can be described by a relative 
neutrality and only concern separatists in Ukraine. Finnish discourse does not expand 
the issue of radicalism further from the context of the Ukrainian crisis. Also, it does not 
appear to accuse any particular states of expressing radical or nationalist sentiments. 
Nonetheless, it points out that Russia has encouraged the separatists in Ukraine:  
’It is also evident that Russia has responsibility for the use of violence in Eastern 
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Ukraine where it has encouraged, financed and even armed the separatists who have 
occupied public buildings, terrorised their opponents and threatened the integrity of the 
country.’ (Tuomioja 27.05.2014) 
However, the passage is still characterised by a relatively mild wording – Finland does 
not suggest that Russia is the direct culprit, but rather a supporter of separatists.   
  Estonian and Russian security discourses, on the other hand, contain a 
significant amount of articulations concerning radicalism. Both are consider the Enemy 
to be the main source of threat that is antagonised. Russian national security discourse 
depicts Maidan protesters and the current Ukrainian authorities as far-right extremists 
and nationalists threatening the stability in Ukraine and in Europe (e.g. Lavrov 
19.02.2014; 22.10.2014), while the Western countries are seen as the indirect culprits, 
the supporters of the radical forces (e.g. Putin 18.03.2014). Namely, Russia accuses the 
West of encouraging the ’anticonsitutional coup’ in Kiev (e.g. Putin 4.03.2014).  
Nevertheless, the threat is sometimes seen as coming directly from particular Western 
countries: Russian authorities point out that some of Russia’s neighbours’, specifically 
the Baltics, are supporters of neonationalism (Putin 15.11.2014). In the Estonian case, 
primarily Russia, but also ’many European countries’, are seen as the forces to hold 
guilty for the revival of nationalism (e.g. Ilves 26.09.2014). Nevertheless, Russia is seen 
as the main proponent of nationalism in Europe, one who is supporting far-right 
sentiments all over the continent (e.g. Ilves 24.09.2014). According to Estonia, Russia is 
breaking international law by supporting the separatist forces in Ukraine (e.g. Mikser 
2.09.2014). Moreover, Estonia’s articulations suggest that the country’s authorities 
depicts Russia not just as a supporter of separatists, but rather the direct source of threat 
that uses separatists as a tool to realise its own interests (ibidem).  
  In addition, Russian and Estonian security discourses often tend to bring 
parallels with historical radicalism when describing the (actions of the) Other. 
Comparisons of contemporary nationalist forces to historical nationalist or fascist forces 
are very common in Russian security discourse (e.g. Lavrov 7.05.2014). At this point it 
seems useful to underline the negative connotation that ’fascism’ has in Russian 
national security discourse. Fascism is the ultimate historical enemy for Russia, the 
‘greatest threat’ in the European history, whereas Russia positions itself as the abolisher 
of fascism, a great power that managed to historically liberate Europe from this 
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ideology, and still affirms its responsibility to protect this mnemonical standpoint.   
  The Estonian case colourfully mirrors its Russian counterpart. Russia’s actions 
are compared to historical nationalism in the Estonian national security discourse (e.g. 
Ilves 24.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). In addition to comparing the annexation of Crimea to 
Hitler’s actions, Toomas Hendrik Ilves repeatedly describes the bike-show in 
Sevastopol that used numerous historical references as a Gesamtkunstwerk in 
comparison to which The Triumph of Will by Leni Riefenstahl seems ‘a liberal work of 
art’ (e.g. Ilves 20.08.2014; 2.09.2014; 13.11.2014). Russia is depicted as the 
contemporary source for (negative) nationalism, repressions, propaganda, intolerance, 
imperialism and ideology (e.g. Ilves 23.06.2014; 26.09.2014).   
  Whilst the Enemy is responsible for encouraging radicalism, both discourses – 
Estonian and Russian – suggest that the solution should be provided by the positive 
force, in other words by Self. As to counteractive measures, Estonia primarily proposes 
imposing sanctions on Russia by the West (e.g. Ilves 2.09.2014; Paet 5.03.2014). 
Russia, on the other hand, underlines its duty to protect the threatened Russian-speaking 
population of Ukraine and affirms that it is willing to use military force to fulfil its task 
(e.g. Putin 4.03.2014).   
  To sum up, Russia and Estonia address the issue of radicalism significantly more 
often than Finland. Manifestations of radicalism are mostly linked to the Enemy in both 
discourses – this strong antagonisation serves to preserve a strong enemy image that is 
also linked to mnemonical issues. Finland, on the other hand, resorts to condemning 
Russia’s support to separatists and does not antagonise the Other.  
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5. CONCLUSION  
In this thesis, three national security discourses – Russian, Estonian and Finnish – were 
analysed. The moment of study was the Ukrainian crisis and only examples of official 
discourse were analysed. Most importantly, the aim was to better understand the 
connection between security policy and national identity in the selected discourses. The 
issues that emerged from the discourses were analysed comparatively, each section 
included all cases. In general, the analysis has shown that the cases may often 
seemingly ’speak the same language’, but the structure behind the signifiers may speak 
a rather different one. The concluding section aims to first discuss the most salient 
issues emerging of the analysis and then, to generate hypotheses based on the findings.   
  Thus, the analysis at two levels – the national and the European one – 
concentrated on structural differences and similarities and revealed quite a consistent 
counter-intuitive pattern. Five principal structural tendencies were detected and 
analysed: protagonisation, polarisation, antagonisation, historisation and neutrality in 
terms of security issues. With regard to national security discourse, Russia and Estonia 
appear to be similar, whereas Finland differs from the former two. As previously 
pointed out, this is likely to be the case in which it is difficult to explain why similar 
actors opt for a different policy views and vice versa. This study assumes a 
poststructuralist view according to which policy and identity are interlinked in a non-
causal relationship within a discourse. Also, it is useful to remind that a lack of causality 
does not imply a lack of structure.    
  The dominant difference between Finnish discourse on the one hand and its 
Estonian and Russian counterparts on the other lies in the observation as to where these 
discourses can be positioned on the neutrality-polarisation axis. The analysis showed 
that Estonian and Russian discourses consistently operate in the realm of the logic of 
equivalence, whereas their Finnish counterpart rather follows the logic of difference. In 
the former two, personalisation, polarisation, antagonisation and historisation occur 
much more frequently and intensively than in the Finnish case that instead demonstrates 
a high degree of neutrality in most of the issues. I believe it is fair to state that in these 
two discourses, polarisation very often reaches a radical level – i.e. we are actually 
presented with a number of examples and issues where straightforward antagonisation is 
used, whereas a positive image on the verge of absolute is attributed to Self. Moreover, 
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antagonisation reaches the extent of demonisation of the Other – the relationship of 
radical otherness is presented along the lines of ‘good’ and ‘evil’. Whilst for Finland, 
the source of threat is most often connected to a rather actor-neutral ‘situation’, Estonian 
and Russian discourses tend to utilise strong polarisation and antagonisation in order to 
differentiate between the negative and positive parties who are depicted as 
symbols/protectors of a wider array of values and actors.   
  Interestingly, Russia and Estonia often merge ‘state’ and ‘nation’, even in the 
cases where the threat could logically be seen as directed against the physical security of 
the state, the identity of the nation is emphasised. This is well-reflected linguistically – 
the distinction between particular ‘us’ and ‘them’ is very clear in the articulations. Also, 
the ‘people’ are often emphasised and merged with ‘nation’ and ‘state’, thus implying 
that ‘people’ are the state and have a right to ‘decide their fate’, thus resulting in a very 
patriotic and emotional articulations. Russia and Estonia constantly personalise the 
threat and project it to a narrower Self, even when addressing the issues specifically 
related to the wider European context, thus protagonising themselves. Finland, on the 
other hand, depicts security matters through a more European lens and remains 
distanced even in case the issues are more related to national level.   As a result, 
the ways to securitise issues in the discourses are strikingly different. For Finland, the 
referent object is rather the wider European identity, it does not project threats directly 
to the national Self. Thus, the intensity of securitisating tone is quite low – for Finland, 
the survival of overall principles is at stake, not that of specific states or nations, let 
alone the narrower national Self. Also, the source of threat is a particular 
situation/event, rather than any specific entity. In the Estonian and Russian cases, 
securitisation is more straightforward – the discourses suggest that action must be taken 
immediately, since the survival of a national identity, of ‘the people’, depends on it. The 
sense of ‘everything being at stake’ is further augmented due to merging nation, state 
and territory in the construction of national identity. Also, the construction of threats is 
enhanced by drawing historical parallels as evidence confirming the severity of the 
threat and allusion to possible scenarios if action is not taken. In addition, both 
discourses consistently point at specific sources of threat that are also directly linked to 
historical constructions of ‘the enemy’. Simultaneously, the discourses claim to be able 
to protect the Self, thus augmenting the sense of security, legitimising security policy 
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and reproducing a polarised national identity through threat construction.  
 Although both Finland and Estonia are member states of the EU, they depict the 
potential role of the organisation very differently. As already said, Finland appears to 
approach the Ukrainian crisis as if on behalf of the EU, not as a narrower Self, a nation 
state. This also applies to possible solutions – Finland suggests a more effective intra-
EU security cooperation as a measure to preserve security in Europe. Estonia, on the 
other hand, distances itself from the EU, claiming that in this specific security context 
the EU lacks unity and decisiveness in responding to the threats – similarly so to the 
viewpoint advocated by Russia. It seems that there is a discrepancy between the 
‘European’ and the Estonian way to articulate security. Estonian security policy is very 
strongly linked to national identity, which seems to be more in line with the alliance-
based intergovernmental logic of NATO. While according to Finnish articulations the 
European security system needs to be preserved for the sake of Europe, in Estonian 
articulations, a stable European security system is a means to preserve the narrower 
Self.   
  Importantly, the findings appear to confirm that the links between national 
identity and security policy, despite of their inherently changing nature, tend to be 
highly consistent and stable – security policies of states are not just specific to the 
contemporary context. Thus, the link between national identity and security policy is 
not one-to one, but embedded into deeper structures of memory that facilitate preserving 
a clearly outlined non-volatile national identity. The states continue articulating security 
issues according to the routinised patterns of relationships, especially those of enmity, 
while continuing to legitimise their mnemonical viewpoints. Although Ukraine is 
physically near to all three countries, it appears that this fact does not shape the 
discursive constructions nearly as much as mnemonical/symbolic proximity. 
Notwithstanding the short geographical distance, Finland still maintains its neutrality 
and distance. For Russia and Estonia, on the other hand, the Ukrainian crisis seems to 
be a particularly fruitful context for reaffirming their polarised constructions of national 
identity. Both Estonia and Russia keep rearticulating historical ‘arch enemies’ that 
contribute to a strong reaffirmation of the inherently positive nature of Self, 
simultaneously legitimising the security policies. Numerous historical parallels 
contribute to an image of an almost eternal enemy that is evil by nature and thus 
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unchangeable. At the same time, Finland’s solid neutral identity constructions dictate 
what can be articulated in the context of the crisis – articulations stemming from the 
logic of equivalence are hence avoided. Identities are strongly reaffirmed through 
corresponding security policies, whereas policies are legitimised and justified through 
polarised ‘historical’ identity constructions. This seems to create a vicious circle of 
routine that is hard to break out of.   
  The findings, in turn, suggest several hypotheses on how to explain the 
relationship between policy and identity in national security discourses. Three 
hypotheses are suggested (these could be further tested on other cases): 
H1: The more national identity is linked to the European identity in security discourses, 
the less polarised the security discourses tend to be. 
Despite the fact that Estonia and Finland are both members of the EU, Finland has been 
a member of the EU for a longer period and has been integrated to a deeper level, 
possibly also in terms of identity. The analysis of security discourses revealed that 
Finland tends to see security issues, or at least position it’s Self in relation to these 
issues, through a ‘European’ perspective, while Estonia and Russia tend to be more 
‘national’ and ‘personal’. Although Estonia is a member of the EU, it clearly does not 
appear to primarily rely on the EU in terms of security issues and Russia, of course, 
does not belong to international organisations of such kind. Nonetheless, it is important 
to keep in mind that a lack of nationalism in official discourse does not imply a lack of 
nationalism in other discourses. Also, under some circumstances, official discourse can 
become more nationalist due to a deeper integration into the EU. Namely, the analysis 
of Ole Wæver (1996) on European security identities showed that often, the more states 
integrated into the EU, the more nations expressed their nationalism.  
H2. The more ‘state’ and ‘nation’ are intertwined in the concept of ‘national security’, 
the more defensive/aggressive the security discourse tends to be.  
Estonia and Russia tend to often use references to ‘nation’ with regard to security, so 
that the physical security of the state is depicted as inseparable from that of a nation. 
Finland, on the other hand, refers to security more often as a common European matter. 
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At the same time, the two former appear to polarise, antagonise and protagonise the 
security issues much more often than the third case.  
H3. The more a specific issue is depicted as (historically) personal, the more 
defensive/aggressive the security discourse becomes.   
Russia considers Ukraine to be a part of (historical) Self and Estonia often brings 
historical parallels between itself and Ukraine, whereas Finland does not resort to such 
comparisons and personalisation.  Nevertheless, it would be unfair to neglect the 
possibility of Finland to do it, for such cases do exist in the Finnish history (e.g. the case 
of Karelia).  
  As for further research, although official discourse provides a solid ground for 
studying national security, a comparison between more marginal discourses and the 
official national discourse could reveal other interesting dynamics, e.g. polarisation 
between the ‘internal’ discourses of a state. Also, an analysis of the evolution of these 
discourses over a longer time period could be studied.    
  Overall, the Ukrainian crisis seems to have brought forth the fundamental 
differences between the national security discourses in Europe and within the EU: in 
fact, some national security discourses appear to be more national than others, whereas 
others can be considered more European. Also, this analysis revealed a problematic 
question as to the role of national security discourses in the current context. If we 
presume moving towards a more Europeanised identity further becomes a common 
tendency, one gets the impulse to ask what are its implications with regard to the 
European security situation. As Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998, p. 29) put it, 
„national security should not be idealised“. Nonetheless, one is tempted to ask the 
question of whether without the idealisation (protagonisation, antagonisation etc.) a 
security discourse can be called national any longer. 
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